At the time of writing, US President Donald Trump is embattled in the White House, Theresa May gambled and lost her government's working majority at the June 2017 General Election, BREXIT is mired in confusion, Trump has pronounced trade wars a 'good thing' and transatlantic relations are unsettled. Now is, therefore, a fascinatingif uncertaintime to consider the state of Anglo-American relations. This article argues that concern for the special relationship arising from Britain's forthcoming loss of influence within the European Union is overstated and obscures a more important considerationnamely the economic capacity of post-BREXIT Britain to continue 'paying the price' of special access to and cooperation with Washington. It also argues that whatever Washington does or does not do during BREXIT negotiations will be an important factor in how Britain emerges from the Union. The terms of British departure are the province of Westminster and Brussels but proactive American shaping of the environment in which BREXIT is negotiated and effected could strengthen British prospects significantly. Conversely were the Trump White House to neglect or mishandle the BREXIT process it would risk greater instability in transatlantic relations and the further erosion of America's most capable and reliable ally.

The 1960 Belgian Congo crisis is generally seen as demonstrating Anglo-American friction and British policy weakness. Macmillan's decision to 'stand aside' during UN 'Operation Grandslam', especially, is cited as a policy failure with long-term corrosive efects on Anglo-American relations. This article recasts this decision as a shrewd manoeuvre in extremely tight circumstances, balancing multiple interests and preventing an open breach with Kennedy's Congo policy. Moreover, 'stand aside' facilitated subsequent Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo, which this article demonstrates by examining events beyond December 1962, where much of the current analysis peters out.