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China has an appalling record of fatalities in its coal mining industry. Moreover, the fatalities observed in township and village coal mines (TVCMs) is much more terrible than that in state-owned coal mines (SOCMs). The safety performance of coal mines is influenced not solely by governmental safety regulation, but by their embedded non-safety regulation games with their internal and external related industries. Therefore, to better understand the safety performances disparity in SOCMs and TVCMs, an embedded non-safety regulation game analysis of the two types of mines is introduced. The paper traces China's safety records of SOCMs and TVCMs, and then analyzes their embedded non-safety regulation games respectively. The result shows that the SOCMs are mainly embedded into non-safety regulation games with the national electric power enterprises, railway sectors, and coal transportation and marketing enterprises; and the TVCMs are mainly embedded into non-safety regulation games with some local government officials and related groups (e.g. local gangdom and journalists). Moreover, in the above embedded games, the SOCMs and TVCMs are often placed in a weaker bargaining position. Besides, the SOCMs and TVCMs also play internal games on coal output and safety. Overall, the SOCMs and TVCMs are embedded into a plurality of different non-safety regulation games which, at least in part, affect their safety investment decisions differently and lead to safety performance disparity eventually.