Emerging critical scholarship on logistics has shown how the field is implicated in a broader necropolitics of violence, disposability, and exploitation. While much has been made of logistics’ historical linkages to military and market forces, this paper, in contrast, explores how logisticians have played an increasingly central role in development and humanitarian missions to theatres of conflict and emergency. It focuses on the effort of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to supply mujahideen forces in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan with the non-lethal materiel necessary for their insurgency. It argues that USAID understood its relief and rehabilitation mission as a problem of logistics. By sketching the shifting contours of USAID’s cross-border programming, this article offers a more nuanced diagnosis of how logistics has become essential to the management of life and death across multiple temporalities, spaces, and scales.

This paper will provide historical and geographical nuance to Eyal Weizman's concept of the 'humanitarian present' through an interrogation of the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) entanglement in Cold War counterinsurgency. Specifically, it focuses on Cold War Vietnam, where USAID, through its Offices of Rural Affairs and Public Safety, spearheaded the 'other' war for rural 'hearts and minds' through two distinct, yet related, suites of spatial interventions. First, it sought to indirectly 'conduct the conduct' of the South Vietnamese people by providing technical assistance and commodity support to the Strategic Hamlet and Revolutionary Development programs. USAID's counterinsurgency programming, however, was not only traversed by a 'will to improve': it was also marked by a 'will to police'. Here, I am specifically referring to the central role that USAID's Office of Public Safety played in helping the government of South Vietnam establish a functioning National Police whose 'internal security' mandate eventually encompassed both a biopolitics of population control as well as a necropolitics of neutralization. Over the course of this essay I will theorize these two tracks of counterinsurgency programming as the Janus faces of a broader 'war-police' nexus geared towards catalyzing the fabrication of a modern social order in the Vietnamese countryside.

In this article, I explore the role that the United States Agency for International Development and its implementing partners played in the ‘alternative development’ effort to provide Afghan farmers with sustainable and economically viable alternatives to growing poppy. I argue that alternative development programs in occupied Afghanistan sought to wean farmers off of poppies by creating a rural ‘environment’ conducive to the cultivation of legal alternative crops. My argument proceeds in four steps. First, I theorize alternative development as a form of ‘environmental power’. Second, I put this theoretical framework to work in eastern Afghanistan through a close reading of one of the United States Agency for International Development’s flagship alternative development projects: Development Alternative Inc.’s ‘Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives – North, East and West’. As Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives: North, East and West (IDEA-NEW) ran its course, its end-state goal shifted from improving production to promoting market exchange. Third, I suggest that IDEA-NEW’s marketization efforts produced differentiated subjects of rule, exacerbating already existing patterns of uneven development in the process. Finally, although IDEA-NEW is represented as productive, humanitarian and therapeutic, I conclude by reflecting on how it is undergirded by – and also provides a legitimating armature for – techniques of population management that are destructive of life.

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