Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant. Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information. Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs, which is consistent with a motivated informationprocessing model of negotiation.

Netherlands. Electronic mail can be sent to wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl. Lying and Deception 2 AbstractIn 4 experiments we examined lying and deception as a function of beliefs about other's cooperative or competitive motivation, and of own social value orientation. In a newly developed Information Provision Game, individuals gave information about payoffs that provided the basis for an interdependent other to make a decision affecting both parties' outcomes. Results showed that withholding information was associated with fear of being exploited, greed, and punitive sentiment, and that giving inaccurate information was associated with greed. Further, individuals gave less accurate and more inaccurate information when the other was competitive rather than cooperative, especially when they had a pro-social rather than selfish value orientation. Finally, individuals facing a competitive other misrepresented the decision problem as one of compatible rather than opposed interests, a tendency indicative of a "if you can't beat them, join them" strategy. Lying and Deception 3 Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision MakingIn his classic novel "The Adventures of Tom Sawyer," Mark Twain tells the story of Tom Sawyer, who is painting Aunt Polly's fence when Ben Rogers walks by, eating an apple and heading for the river to go for a swim. It is a beautiful day and when Ben asks why Tom is painting the fence rather than going for a swim, Tom decides not to answer truthfully--instead he tells Ben that he is actually enjoying himself and that painting the fence is an interesting and gratifying activity. Because Tom is so convincing, he actually raises Ben's desire to engage in whitewashing and, after some negotiation, Tom hands over the brush to Ben, and lies down in the shadow eating the rest of Ben's apple.By suggesting he loves whitewashing, and thus misrepresenting his true preferences, Tom Sawyer manipulates Ben Rogers to make a decision that is favorable to Tom. And although few of us may be as cunning and convincing as Tom Sawyer, we often find ourselves in situations where we can influence others by manipulating information and misrepresenting our true preferences and priorities. Tobacco companies misrepresent the addictive properties of nicotine (Tenbrunsel, 1998). Car owners deliberately conceal technical problems when trying to sell their car (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). When negotiating a divorce, a husband may misrepresent the importance of having child custody to induce his spouse to concede on alimentation costs (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997).Although lying and deception have been of interest to the social sciences for many decades, this research has mainly focused on animal and human ability to distinguish cheaters from non-cheaters (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992;DePaulo, 1992). Far less research has been concerned with what Tom Sawyer was doing--the active misrepresentation of values, preferences and priorities. Extending interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978;Rusbult & Van Lange, ...

A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires van Dijk, E.; van Kleef, G.A.; Steinel, W.; van Beest, I. General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. Of the interpersonal emotions during bargaining, anger has received most attention.The basic question that researchers have addressed is whether anger has disruptive or perhaps positive effects in bargaining (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004a, b). The results of these studies provided support for the social functions approach described above. Van Kleef et al. (2004a, b), for example, compared how bargainers reacted to an angry opponent and to a happy opponent. For this purpose, they presented their participants a negotiation task, in which they could make the first offer.Subsequently, their (simulated) opponent made a preprogrammed counteroffer, after which participants made a new offer, and the negotiation process continued. During six rounds of offers and counteroffers, participants received emotional reactions from their opponent.These reactions either signaled that the opponent was angry or happy.

Emotions such as anger and happiness have pervasive interpersonal eVects in negotiations. We propose that the nature of the eVects depends on the target of the emotion, that is, whether the emotion is directed toward a person or a speciWc behavior. In a computermediated negotiation (N D 87), participants received either angry or happy messages from a simulated opponent, which were either behavior-oriented or person-directed. Behavior-oriented anger elicited larger concessions than behavior-oriented happiness, whereas person-directed anger elicited smaller concessions than person-directed happiness. This reversal could be attributed to the strategic value of the emotional expression, which was higher in the behavior-oriented condition than in the person-directed condition. These Wndings show that the interpersonal eVects of anger and happiness depend critically on the target of the emotion.

How does a representative's position in the group influence behaviour in intergroup negotiation? Applying insights from the social identity approach (specifically self-categorization theory), the effects of group member prototypicality, accountability and group attractiveness on competitiveness in intergroup bargaining were examined. As representatives of their group, participants engaged in a computer-mediated negotiation with a simulated out-group opponent. In Experiment 1 (N=114), representatives with a peripheral status in the group sent more competitive and fewer cooperative messages to the opponent than did prototypical representatives, but only under accountability. Experiment 2 (N=110) replicated this finding, and showed that, under accountability, peripherals also made higher demands than did prototypicals, but only when group membership was perceived as attractive. Results are discussed in relation to impression management and strategic behaviour.