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Where there is a team, there is envy emotion among team members. Prior studies argue that two opposite types of envy—benign envy and malicious envy differently influence team members’ interactions, thus impact team creativity differently. However, little literature has discussed whether envy has a direct influence on team creativity. This research is conducted to narrow this literature gap. Moreover, if their relationship was verified, the mechanism needs to be further explored. Previous studies have shown negative public perception of envy and strong behavioral motivation function of it. Therefore, a morality-related variable—moral reflection, and a competition-related variable—knowledge seeking are introduced as mediating variables. To test the relationships among the above variables, an experiment with 74 MBA students’ participation was conducted. The results show the positive relationship between benign envy and team creativity, while malicious envy gets the opposite result. Besides, knowledge seeking and moral reflection are proven to be bridges connecting envy and team creativity. Envy is more complicated than what previous studies have found. It has positive sides to team creativity.

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In order to improve the market value of the product, the platform enterprise often participates in the development process of supporting product of emerging industry’s platform innovation ecosystem. This paper puts forward a revenue sharing contract between the platform company and the supporting company by creating a collaborative development model of the supporting product in the ecosystem, and this paper studies the platform enterprise investment resource property's (complementary or substitution) impact on the supporting enterprise R&D efforts and the revenue sharing factor and analyzes collaborative development mechanism of supporting product of emerging industry platform innovation ecosystem. The research indicates that when platform enterprise and supporting enterprise's resources are complementary, the supporting enterprise R&D effort level and revenue sharing coefficient increase as the platform company’s investment increases. When platform enterprise and supporting enterprise's resources are substitutive, the supporting enterprise’s R&D effort level and revenue sharing coefficient decrease as the platform company’s investment increases.

The uncertainty of eco-friendly intermediate components has an important impact on green supply chain decisions. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model of green investment decision-making among enterprises is established by considering the case of the supplier’s green investment alone and the case of the manufacturer and the supplier’s joint green investment. The influence of green uncertainty on enterprise’s decision-making is analyzed, and the green investment decision-making strategies of both sides in two cases are compared. There are four main conclusions derived from the results: (i) with the increase in the supplier’s green cost coefficient, the supplier will reduce the green investment and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (ii) with a decrease in uncertainty for eco-friendly intermediate components and the increase in their feasibility factor, the supplier will increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase the investment in environment, and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (iii) the increase in the manufacturer’s share of green costs will promote the supplier to increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase its green investment, which shall increase the supplier’s optional choice space of for green investment; (iv) in the case of the manufacturer and the supplier jointly making a green investment, the threshold value for the environmental input of the supply chain members (i.e., the manufacturer and the supplier) is lower, and the supply chain members will have more choice space. At the same time, the care for environment in the case of a cooperative is higher than that in the case of a supplier investing alone.