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Purpose This paper aims to propose a two-period model, including an original manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer, in which the products manufactured by the original manufacturer are patent-protected and the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products influences the purchasing decisions of consumers. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyzes the decisions of the original manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party remanufacturer of two periods, using Stackelberg game and obtains the equilibrium solutions of the three parties. Findings The study finds that consumers’ focus degree to the remanufacturing degree has a negative correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale price of new products in the first period, but has a positive correlation with the retail price of new products in the second period. Originality/value (1) Consumers’ focus degree to the remanufacturing degree has a negative correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale price of new products in the first period, but has a positive correlation with the retail price of new products in the second period. (2) The remanufacturing action efficiency of the third-party remanufacturer has a positive correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale and retail prices of new products in the second period.

In this paper, we consider a class of semivectorial bilevel programming problem. An exact penalty function is proposed for such a problem. Based on this penalty function, an algorithm, which can obtain a global solution of the original problem, is presented. Finally, some numerical results illustrate its feasibility.

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The huge market and perfect production system in China are attracting more multi-national companies’ interest to invest in China in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Therefore, multi-national companies are willing to integrate and optimize global supply chain networks of their own, which enable them to reduce cost and improve market response. As a result, multi-national companies usually embed into local industrial clusters through financial and technological comparative merits to sharpen their competitive edge. This paper considers the across-chain network equilibrium problem involving process of competition and melting between this new global chain and an already existing local chain. The authors model the optimizing behavior of these two chains, derive the equilibrium conditions, and establish the variational inequality formulation, and solve it by using the modified algorithm. Finally, the authors illustrate the model through numerical example and discuss relationships among the price, quantity, technological progress, and satisfaction among two dynamic phases.