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In a wireless sensor network nod conditions and send the measurements over mu base-station. The base-station aggregates the and based on the findings it orchestrates autonomously or through consultation with a center. Thus, the role of the base-station is network can be non-functional and/or isolated breaks down or gets destroyed. No won environment, an adversary will target the ba the most damage to the network. The fact th acts as a sink of all data traffic makes it vulne tracking packet transmission and detecting paper investigates a novel strategy to counter t boosts the anonymity of the base-station. A se higher power in order to increase its number confuse an adversary who is assessing the link quest to identify the route to the base-station and simulation results are provided to cap increased transmission power on the base-stati

Abstract-In wireless sensor networks, all data packets are routed from the individual sensor nodes towards an in-situ basestation (BS). Such traffic pattern makes the BS vulnerable to adversary's attack. Basically, an adversary would intercept the ongoing transmissions and localize their sources. Then by employing traffic analysis techniques, an adversary would correlate the intercepted transmissions to uncover the data path which may lead to the location of the BS. Evidence theory is a well-known scheme that an adversary might use for traffic analysis. However, prior work considered only intercepted transmissions as evidences in the correlation process without factoring in the time of interception. In this paper, we argue that time-based correlation increases the accuracy of the traffic analysis and makes contemporary countermeasures ineffective. A novel technique is proposed to counter the time correlation and boost the anonymity of the BS. The technique imposes buffering delay at each relaying node on the data route in order to disturb the time correlation among consecutive transmissions. Our technique is validated through simulation.

The base station (BS) in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) plays the role of a data sink, a point of contact with the upper hierarchy, and an in-situ command and control unit. Such an essential role makes the BS a target for attacks in a hostile environment. Even if its presence is camouflaged, an adversary may locate the BS by applying traffic analysis. Basically, the adversary can intercept radio transmissions and correlate them using techniques like Evidence theory (ET). The ET attack model only uses spatial aspects of intercepted transmissions in order to deduce knowledge about data routes. In this paper, we propose an enhanced version of ET (EET) which utilizes temporal correlation of transmissions to draw further valuable insight about the network topology. Analyzing ET and extending its capability are very fundamental for the network in order to avoid the illusive sense of security by guarding against a weaker attack model than what could be potentially launched. Moreover, we develop a novel and effective countermeasure, called Assisted Deception (AD) that needs no involvement of BS and is resilient to both ET and EET. By implementing AD, nodes coordinate and inject timed deceptive packets to target temporal correlation of consecutive transmissions that EET relies on. The attack and countermeasure are validated through extensive simulation experiments.

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