Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is what we would expect from the vantage point of the armchair philosophy picture. The results also show, however, that the percentages of articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. This trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in philosophy.

The "received wisdom" in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this "received wisdom." The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust's Digital Library, which provide some empirical support for the second rather than the first hypothesis. Our data also suggest that appealing to intuition is a much older philosophical methodology than the "received wisdom" alleges. We then discuss the implications of our findings for the contemporary debate over philosophical methodology.

The role of audiences in mathematical proof has largely been neglected, in part due to misconceptions like those in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) which bar mathematical proofs from bearing reflections of audience consideration. In this paper, I argue that mathematical proof is typically argumentation and that a mathematician develops a proof with his universal audience in mind. In so doing, he creates a proof which reflects the standards of reasonableness embodied in his universal audience. Given this framework, we can better understand the introduction of proof methods based on the mathematician's likely universal audience. I examine a case study from Alexander and Briggs's work on knot invariants to show that we can fruitfully reconstruct mathematical methods in terms of audiences.

We apply a pattern-based classification method to identify clinical and genomic features associated with the progression of Chronic Kidney disease (CKD). We analyze the African-American Study of Chronic Kidney disease with Hypertension dataset and construct a decision-tree classification model, consisting 15 combinatorial patterns of clinical features and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), seven of which are associated with slow progression and eight with rapid progression of renal disease among African-American Study of Chronic Kidney patients. We identify four clinical features and two SNPs that can accurately predict CKD progression. Clinical and genomic features identified in our experiments may be used in a future study to develop new therapeutic interventions for CKD patients.

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