Ontological Categories 2011
DOI: 10.1515/9783110329599.15
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1. Categoriality: Three Disputes Over the Structure of the World

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Cited by 5 publications
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“…Neither could the black color of the hot chocolate cease to be a property and become a member of another category, for example, a member of the category of particular like the cup of hot chocolate. By contrast, Cumpa (, , ) has defended what Rosenkrantz () has called “categorial inessentialism”, namely, the view that items do not have categorial essences. According to this view, items do not have categories essentially but rather contingently in virtue of scientific possibilities of combination.…”
Section: Categorial Metaontologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Neither could the black color of the hot chocolate cease to be a property and become a member of another category, for example, a member of the category of particular like the cup of hot chocolate. By contrast, Cumpa (, , ) has defended what Rosenkrantz () has called “categorial inessentialism”, namely, the view that items do not have categorial essences. According to this view, items do not have categories essentially but rather contingently in virtue of scientific possibilities of combination.…”
Section: Categorial Metaontologymentioning
confidence: 99%