8 Contextualising Religious Pain: Saba Mahmood, Axel Honneth, and the Danish Cartoons

Jakobsen, Jonas

doi:10.1163/9789004287341_010

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…This happens in any normal life and is clearly compatible with having reasonable opportunities to attain and maintain a healthy level of self-esteem. Some wounds to our self-esteem we must simply learn to live with (Jakobsen, 2015;Van den Brink, 2011). In contrast, the ideal of zero societal stigmatization is more realistic and clearly worth striving for (Honneth, 1995: 121-130;Jakobsen, 2015;Laitinen, 2015: 66-68).…”

Section: Indulgence and Burdensomenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some wounds to our self-esteem we must simply learn to live with (Jakobsen, 2015;Van den Brink, 2011). In contrast, the ideal of zero societal stigmatization is more realistic and clearly worth striving for (Honneth, 1995: 121-130;Jakobsen, 2015;Laitinen, 2015: 66-68). Under what conditions, then, would it be an unreasonable burden for the envious to redirect their attention to other goods that also deliver esteem (albeit less, perhaps) and are, for them, more obtainable?…”

Section: Indulgence and Burdensomenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Envy, self-esteem, and distributive justice

Stensen

2022

European Journal of Political Theory

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Most agree that envy, or at least the malicious kind(s), should not have any role in the moral justification of distributive arrangements. This paper defends a contrary position. It argues that at the very least John Rawls, Axel Honneth and others that care about the social bases of self-esteem have good reasons to care about the levels of envy that different distributive principles reliably generate. The basic argument is that (1) envy involves a particular kind of harm to self-esteem such that excluding envy-avoidance from the more general commitment to protect self-esteem requires a justification. (2) There are no strong reasons for this exclusion. I discuss three objections to the second premise: that envy is irrational, that it is unfair to prevent and compensate for it, and that envy-avoidance is unreasonable due to the vicious or antisocial nature of envy. The response is that envy can be rational with respect to opportunities for attaining social esteem; that it is not unfair to prevent or compensate for envy that is reasonably unavoidable and relatively burdensome; and the kind of envy-avoidance I defend does not appear unreasonable if distinguished from a form of preference-satisfaction.

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Section: Indulgence and Burdensomenessmentioning

confidence: 99%