A Causal Analysis of the Defense Expenditures of the USA and the USSR

Correa, Héctor; Kim, Jiwon

doi:10.1177/0022343392029002004

Cited by 11 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The analyses in this paper concentrate on domestic spending, because spending for defense and international relations may be confounded by mixtures of internal and external influences (Correa and Kim 1992;Mintz 1988;True 1995). Budget subfunctions focus on the long-term government purpose that is served-e.g., food and nutrition assistance, conservation and land management, pollution control and abatement, or atomic energy defense activities.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Punctuations: U.S. Budget Authority, 1947-1995

Jones¹,

Baumgartner²,

True³

1998

The Journal of Politics

171

135

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This content downloaded from 128.235.Baumgartner and Jones (1993) described a process of punctuated equilibrium in their study of policymaking in the United States since World War II. Evidence was drawn from a series of particular issue-areas, but the model has implications for all areas of policymaking. In this paper, we explore the validity of this approach with a new dataset that tabulates congressional budget authority at the Office of Management and Budget subfunction level across all areas of the federal budget for the entire postwar period.We find that government spending is characterized by much greater change than is typically portrayed in the literature, even if there is great stability for most categories most of the time. In addition, overall patterns of spending have been affected by two large-scale punctuations. These punctuations divide national spending into three epochs. one of postwar adjustment, lasting until FY 1956; one of robust growth, lasting from 1956 through 1974, and one of restrained growth, beginning in FY 1976. We test the epoch hypothesis against three plausible rival hypotheses: changes in the robustness of the postwar economy; partisan divisions; and public opinion. The epoch hypothesis survives all of these rivals whether modeled individually or together. This paper provides empirical evidence that punctuations occur, not just in some programs or subsystems, but also throughout government. The General ApproachPolicymaking within subsystems in the United States is dominated by a process alternating between periods of relative gridlock and periods of dramatic change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Such punctuated equilibria seem characteristic of many complex systems. They are evident in the evolution of species (Eldredge 1985), in economics, when new technologies disrupt prevailing patterns of doing business (Thurow 1996), and in computer simulations of iterated games (Lindgren 1992). These punctuations interspersed with periods of stasis may have both exogenous and endogenous causes. Complex interactions among Policy Punctuations 3 tively divide the postwar period into three epochs, which seem to correspond to widely shared, but dramatically different, conceptions of the proper role of government during these three periods.We test our finding of two large-scale punctuations against three plausible rival hypotheses. The first is that the epochs are in fact simply reflective of changes in the robustness of the postwar economy. In good times, more is spent; in lean times, less. Second, we study the hypothesis that spending eras reflect partisan divisions. When Democrats control both the executive and legislative branches, they increase the size of gove...

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Punctuations: U.S. Budget Authority, 1947-1995

Jones¹,

Baumgartner²,

True³

1998

The Journal of Politics

171

135

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…The basic idea of the organizational politics model is that the complexity of the decision-making process leads to the establishment of routinized practices (standard operating procedures, SOPs, or rules of thumb), which introduce a certain degree of predictability. In the context of defense spending this means that the best predictor of new increments to military spending is simply the increments of the immediate past; that is the main determinant of this year's defense budget is last year's budget 4 (Correa and Kim, 1992;Kamlet and Mowery, 1987;Rattinger, 1975).…”

Section: Theoretical Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most studies on the demand for military spending employ time-series analysis for individual countries. For example, Looney and Mehay (1990) estimated the demand for military spending in the USA; Correa and Kim (1992) in the USA and Soviet Union; Smith (1990) in the United Kingdom; Schmidt, Pilandon and Aben (1990) in France; Fritz-Assmus and Zimmermann (1990) in West Germany; Deger and Sen (1990) in India and Pakistan; Avramides (1997) in Greece. There are also a few cross-sectional studies (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2001;Maizels and Nissanke, 1986;Dudley and Montmarquette, 1981).…”

Section: Empirical Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This model, despite its theoretical parsimony, dynamic nature, intuitive plausibility, and popularity is subject to many types of criticism, for example, that it pays little attention to how actual decisions are made, and to the institutional procedures surrounding them.3 See, for example,Kollias and Makrydakis, 1997;Georgiou et al, 1996;Correa and Kim, 1992;Deger and Sen, 1990;Cusack and Ward, 1981. …”

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confidence: 99%

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Does Neutrality Make a Difference? Explaining Patterns of Swiss Defense Spending in 1975–2001

Bernauer

Koubi

Ernst³

2009

Defence and Peace Economics

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We study the behavior of defense spending in Switzerland in 1975-2001. Our main interest is in determining how neutrality in international affairs (non-membership in military alliances) affects defense spending. We find that neutrality is associated with a perception of lower levels of external threat; hence it confers economic benefits in the form of a smaller defense burden. However, neutrality does not fully insulate a country from variations in the level of external threat in the global system as perceived by members of military alliances. Swiss defense spending has tracked very closely the spending trends-but at a lower average levelof the United States and other NATO countries. To the extent post-Cold War threats, such as international terrorism, materialize primarily in the context of existing security alliances, Swiss military spending patterns observed in 1975-2001 are likely to remain the same in the future.

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“…Evidence for the United States is mixed (see Kollias and Paleologou 2003;Eichenberg and Stoll 2003;Karagol and Turhan 2008;Dalen and Swank 1996;Wlezien 1996;Nincic and Cusack 1979;Correa and Kim 1992).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The growth in military expenditure in Germany 1951–2011: did parties matter?

Kauder

Potrafke

2015

Defence and Peace Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We examine whether government ideology was correlated with the growth in military expenditure in Germany over the period 1951-2011. By using various measures of government ideology, the results do not show any effect. The exception is an ideology measure based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (Left-Right scale): using this measure, the results show that the growth in military expenditure increased by about 2.4 percentage points, when the ideology variable (right-wing) increased by one standard deviation. This effect, however, is based on observations until the early 1960s and cannot be generalized. The major political parties agreed on how to evaluate international risks and threats. Government ideology retired to the background. We conjecture that the consensus among the major parties will persist -even if military spending needs to be increased in response to new international risks and threats. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D720, H000.

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A Causal Analysis of the Defense Expenditures of the USA and the USSR

Cited by 11 publications

References 19 publications

Policy Punctuations: U.S. Budget Authority, 1947-1995

Policy Punctuations: U.S. Budget Authority, 1947-1995

Does Neutrality Make a Difference? Explaining Patterns of Swiss Defense Spending in 1975–2001

The growth in military expenditure in Germany 1951–2011: did parties matter?

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