A Conceptual Framework for the Inclusion of Exogenous Factors into Collusive Bidding Price Decisions

Wang, Xiaowei; Ye, Kunhui; Chen, Mengkai; Yao, Zhangfeng

doi:10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000981

Cited by 15 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…Aligning policymaking with the needs of the social environment is the cornerstone of quality social development, and vertical collusion puts such goals at risk [1][2][3]. Most extant research on collusive bidding has focused on corruption networks, behavioral detection, and gaming theory aspects [4][5][6][7][8].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

CRITIC‐Based Vertical Collusion Control Quality Prediction Based on the Coupling and Coordination Degrees of Socioenvironmental and Public‐Investment Bidding Systems in China

Chen

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Currently, in China, the bidding processes for government socioenvironmental projects face threats of collusion between officials and vendors. This study introduces a coupling and coordination degree-measurement model to study the relationship between the quality of vertical collusion controls and the socioenvironmental system of China based on bidding data taken from 2006 to 2020. The coupling degree describes the socioeconomic influence felt between systems, and the coordination degree refers to their sustainable focused cooperation and mutual influence. The criteria importance through intercriteria correlation method was used to quantify these degrees. To smooth out periods of missing data, the autoregressive integrated moving average model was employed, and the first-order, one-variable, time-series forecasting method was then used to project the trend to 2025. The results revealed that the quality of vertical collusion controls based on the degrees of coupling and coordination between external socioenvironmental and public investment systems ranged from 0.151 to 0.700. Dissonance was detected from 2006 to 2015, but the overall coupling degree has been on an upward trend, peaking in 2020. Currently, the quality of vertical collusion controls is in its primary coordination stage, although it is improving rapidly. From the projected years, both coupling and coordination degrees will enter an intermediate coordination stage by 2022, when the growth rate of the coupling degree is overtaken by that of the coordination degree, as long as active strategies are applied to harmonize the systems in terms of anticollusion measures.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

CRITIC‐Based Vertical Collusion Control Quality Prediction Based on the Coupling and Coordination Degrees of Socioenvironmental and Public‐Investment Bidding Systems in China

Chen

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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“…Finally, the leading colluder manipulates all collusive members' bids and decides that he is the final winning bidder by default [6]. Current research on collusive bidding mainly focuses on the collusive reason [12,[20][21][22][23][24], determining factors [12,21,[25][26][27][28], penalty [21,[24][25][26][28][29][30], influence factors [7,20,21,25,26,31,32], governance [21,33,34], collusion forms [25,26,31,[35][36][37], and collusion cost [30,38].…”

Section: Collusive Bidding In Urban Construction Projectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Collusive bidding refers to cases in which independent firms disclose their bidding prices to each other before the bidding process starts [6]. This practice allows the bidding Land 2022, 11, 643 2 of 14 firms to predetermine who will win the contract [7], which creates a non-competitive bidding environment, increases standard market costs, and causes economic damage to non-cartel bidders [8][9][10][11]. Projects acquired by collusive bidding always have serious safety risks and quality problems threatening public safety [3,12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Influence of Collusive Information Dissemination on Bidder’s Collusive Willingness in Urban Construction Projects

Wang

Zhuang

et al. 2022

Land

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The process of urbanization and urban regeneration is inseparable from the implementation of urban construction projects. Current studies show a large amount of collusive bidding in urban construction projects, which has seriously affected healthy and sustainable urban development. Therefore, the governance of collusive bidding in urban construction projects is crucial to sustainable urbanization and urban renewal. In reality, the collusion information dissemination (CID) is a key influential factor in the bidder’s collusive willingness (BCW). Knowing the influence of CID on BCW will help city managers to have a clearer understanding of the causes and governance focus of collusive bidding. Thus, the study using the multi-agent simulation technology simulates the influence of CID on BCW in different market scales, communication intensities, and trust boundaries based on the Deffuant model. The research found that the negative impact of the CID on the market is more incredible in cities with smaller market sizes, and effectively inhibiting the CID can reduce the occurrence of collusion. Moreover, the research also found that colluders always form their collusive alliances within CID networks. These findings suggest that urban managers should strengthen the suppression of collusive bidding by weakening the dissemination of collusive information and blocking the CID networks.

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“…Numerous collusive bidding cases, including price cartel, bid rigging, and bid rotation, are often reported worldwide [3][4][5]. The lack of effective countermeasures has made collusive bidding a stubborn disturbance to market operation [6,7], resulting in economic disruption [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Break the Cycle of Collusion: Simulation to Influence Mechanism of Cognitive Bias on To-Collude Decision Making

Zhengmin

2022

Buildings

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Collusion is an all-pervading illegal market behavior that can undermine the sustainable development of the construction industry. It is acknowledged that collusive bidding decision making is influenced by conspirators’ cognitive bias. Nevertheless, the understanding of such an influence mechanism remains vague in the literature. This study aims to examine the mechanism of conspirators’ to-collude decision making by establishing a system dynamic model. The model development is based on the theories of cognitive biases, collusive bidding, and complex adaptive system. Multiple scenarios were simulated in the context of the Chinese construction industry. Three most influential cognitive bias are overconfidence, the illusion of control, and cognitive dissonance. The simulation results reveal conspirators’ intrinsic mechanisms to decide whether they deserve to participate in collusive bidding. The evolution of to-collude decision making is characterized by nonlinearity, multiplier, and stimulus enhancement effects. Collusion motivation and enterprise network relationships expand conspirators’ to-collude decision making. The increase of government regulation intensity and enterprise performance inhibit conspirators’ to-collude decision making. This study provides an insight into the cycle of collusion emergence from a complex system perspective and implies that antitrust authorities can launch carrot-and-stick measures for better regulation.

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A Conceptual Framework for the Inclusion of Exogenous Factors into Collusive Bidding Price Decisions

Cited by 15 publications

References 64 publications

CRITIC‐Based Vertical Collusion Control Quality Prediction Based on the Coupling and Coordination Degrees of Socioenvironmental and Public‐Investment Bidding Systems in China

CRITIC‐Based Vertical Collusion Control Quality Prediction Based on the Coupling and Coordination Degrees of Socioenvironmental and Public‐Investment Bidding Systems in China

The Influence of Collusive Information Dissemination on Bidder’s Collusive Willingness in Urban Construction Projects

Break the Cycle of Collusion: Simulation to Influence Mechanism of Cognitive Bias on To-Collude Decision Making

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