A duopoly game with heterogeneous green supply chains in optimal price and market stability with consumer green preference

Yu, Wang; Hou, Guisheng

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.120161

Cited by 67 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…From the structure of formula (12) and formula (13), it can be seen that the univariate primary function formula with L as the independent variable is the solution of HJB equation, satisfying…”

Section: Model Analysis a Nash Non Cooperative Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, it is necessary for government to take some financial measures, including but not limited to environmental taxes, subsidies, to encourage remanufacturers to shoulder the responsibility of recycling waste products [4][5][6][7][8] and remanufacturing [9][10][11][12]. Besides, the necessity of environmental protection and green purchase behavior is addressed by the increasing consumers [13]. According to a survey from Brecard [1], 83% of Europeans pay great attention to the impact of products on the environment when they buy products, and 75% are "more willing to buy environmentally-friendly products, even if they are slightly more expensive".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Analysis of Environmental Policy’s Impact on Remanufacturing Decision Under the Effect of Green Network Using Differential Game Model

et al. 2020

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Consumers' environmental protection awareness promotes the quality of green products produced by remanufacturers, which requires higher input cost and more efforts but wins environmental reputation in return. In order to encourage remanufacturers to produce products with less pollution, government enacts environmental policy to subsidy the production of remanufacturing. This paper aims to analyze the impact of subsidy on remanufacturing decision and identify the optimal decisions under the effect of green network using a differential game model. First, both government and remanufacturer's cost functions are established with their own environmental effort, respectively. Then, their benefit functions are built to represent their own reward, in which multiple factors are taken into account including but not limited to the environmental reputation of remanufacturer and consumers' demand for remanufactured products. Using the models of Nash-non cooperative game, Stackelberg master-slave game and cooperative game, their benefits are calculated and compared. The equilibrium results show that the improvement level of products' environmental quality is equal to the level of subsidies, and subsidies will increase with the improvement of products' environmental quality. In addition, with the support of the government, remanufactures are able to produce the most environmentally friendly products with the most benefit. Finally, a case study is given to prove the theorems obtained in this paper.

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Section: Model Analysis a Nash Non Cooperative Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Environmental Policy’s Impact on Remanufacturing Decision Under the Effect of Green Network Using Differential Game Model

et al. 2020

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“…Accordingly, consumers’ green preference belongs to environmental and economic performance. Consumers’ green preference has a significant effect on their green purchase behavior, which affects the profit of recycling units [ 17 ]. Therefore, GDP should be considered in the decision-making process of the closed-loop supply chain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

Long

Liu

et al. 2020

IJERPH

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The low efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling has restricted the green development of China’s construction industry. Additionally, the government’s reward–penalty mechanism has a huge influence on green development. This study aimed to investigate the effect of green development performance (GDP) and the government’s reward–penalty mechanism on the decision-making process of production and recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Therefore, the strategies’ evolutionary paths of production and recycling units were investigated by using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, an evolutionary game model between production units and recycling units was proposed under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios were discussed. Finally, the effects of the relevant parameters on the evolutionary paths of the game model were analyzed using numerical simulations. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) When the range of GDP changes, the evolutionary stable strategy changes accordingly. GDP plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality development of the CDW recycling supply chain, but an increase in GDP can easily lead to the simultaneous motivation of free-riding. (2) The government’s reward–penalty mechanism effectively regulates the decision-making process of production and recycling units. An increase in the subsidy rate and supervision probability helps to reduce free-riding behavior. Moreover, the incentive effect of the subsidy probability on recycling units is more obvious, while the effect of the supervision probability on improving the motivation of active participation for production units is more remarkable. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis to ensure production and recycling units to make optimal strategy choices under different conditions but also provides a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable reward–penalty mechanism that is conducive to a macro-control market.

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“…Environmental awareness has grown drastically over the last several decades. As concerns developed, consumer taste and preference for green products became ubiquitous [ 1 , 2 ]. In response to this change, automotive firms began to produce green vehicles, including not only energy-saving fuel vehicles (FV) but also pure electrical vehicles (EV).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Consumer Subsidy on Green Technology Innovations for Vehicles and Environmental Impact

Zhang

Wang

Zhao

2020

IJERPH

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In the pressure of excessive resource consumption and serious environmental pollution, governments provide various consumer subsidies to promote sales of energy-saving vehicles, including the energy-saving fuel vehicle (FV) and the pure electric vehicle (EV) in the automobile industry. Utilizing a Hotelling model, this paper explores two competing firms’ decisions on the selection of green technology innovations for vehicles, namely producing either the energy-saving FV or the pure EV, while the two vehicles are different from each other on not only the energy-saving level but also the consumer’s acceptance. We further explore the impact of the government’s consumer subsidy on the profits, environment, and consumer surplus. We find that the two competing firms’ equilibrium selections of green technology innovations for vehicles change as the variable manufacturing cost of the pure EV varies. In particular, when the variable manufacturing cost of the pure EV is moderate, the firm with a lower technology capacity for improving the energy-saving level of the FV (i.e., firm 2) will produce the pure EV while the other firm (i.e., firm 1) produces the energy-saving FV, and the converse is not true. In this case, the decreasing variable manufacturing cost of the pure EV will benefit firm 2 and make firm 1 lose in a competing context. In particular, both firms would charge lower retail prices as the variable manufacturing cost of the EV decreases. In addition, we find that although the consumer subsidy could reduce the purchasing cost for the consumer and promote both firms to produce higher energy-saving level vehicles, a firm can still reduce its retail price under certain conditions because of the competition between the two firms. Finally, we prove that the consumer subsidy can be always beneficial to the environment, while it may hurt the consumer surplus and the firms’ profits under certain conditions. The results provide suggestions for governments to adopt an appropriate consumer subsidy program from perspectives of the consumer, environment, and economy.

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A duopoly game with heterogeneous green supply chains in optimal price and market stability with consumer green preference

Cited by 67 publications

References 45 publications

Analysis of Environmental Policy’s Impact on Remanufacturing Decision Under the Effect of Green Network Using Differential Game Model

Analysis of Environmental Policy’s Impact on Remanufacturing Decision Under the Effect of Green Network Using Differential Game Model

An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

The Impact of Consumer Subsidy on Green Technology Innovations for Vehicles and Environmental Impact

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