A dynamic key management scheme for dynamic wireless sensor networks

Abstract

Dynamic wireless sensor network (DWSN) is a group of mobile sensor nodes deployed in an intended area. Secure communication in DWSNs depends on the existence of an efficient key management scheme. Because of the movements of sensor nodes and unknown mobility pattern, dynamic key management is an important issue in such networks. In this paper, we propose a new key management scheme, which uses key pre-distribution and post-deployment key establishment mechanisms for DWSNs. The proposed approach ensures that the two communicating nodes share at least one common key. It also provides efficient ways for key generation and revocation as well as addition or deletion of mobile sensor nodes. Compared with the other key management schemes, which are designed for DWSNs, our simulation and analytical results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed approach in terms of confidentiality, resilience, memory usage, energy consumption and overhead. categorized into three sub-categories: exclusion basis system-based [6,7], polynomial secret-sharing-based [8,9], and deterministic sequence number-based [10] schemes. Moreover, variety in the network structures forces centralized approaches to be classified into three groups: flat network-based [11,12], hierarchical network-based [13,14], or heterogeneous network-based [15] approaches. According to the characteristics of flat networks, nodes have the same responsibilities and capabilities.

Energy-efficient and secure mobile node reauthentication scheme for mobile wireless sensor networks

“…Mobile node reauthentication schemes for MWSNs can be classified into two types according to their encryption techniques: symmetric key cryptography schemes [9][10][11][13][14][15] and public key cryptography schemes [16][17][18][19]. Symmetric key cryptography schemes can be further classified into two types: post-deployment key establishment schemes [9][10][11]13] and hybrid schemes that use both random key pre-distribution and post-deployment key establishment mechanisms [14,15].…”

“…The previous schemes use only the post-deployment key establishment mechanism, whereas hybrid schemes [14,15] use both random key pre-distribution and postdeployment key establishment mechanisms. In these schemes, by default, two nodes authenticate each other and establish a pairwise key based on existing random key pre-distribution schemes [20,21].…”

Cryptanalysis and improvement of a chaotic maps‐based anonymous authenticated key agreement protocol for multiserver architecture

“…Referring to the open‐ended communication environment, security is a key issue such that keeping confidentiality for messages being transferred between correspondents and establishing a shared secure session key for ensuring their subsequent communications. Authentication mechanism is an important and fundamental tool that offers only authorized users to access the mobile service and negotiates a session key between participators via an insecure channel. Naturally, many researchers devote to presenting various authenticated key agreement protocols that employ all kinds of cryptographic primitives (e.g.…”

Anticollusion Attack Noninteractive Security Hierarchical Key Agreement Scheme in WHMS

“…Thus, obtaining cryptographic keys is an essential operation to achieve the security goals in WHMS. There are several key agreement schemes that have been proposed for WHMS applications [5,[7][8][9][10].…”