A framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding protocols

Avoine, Gildas; Bingöl, Muhammed Ali; Kardaş, Süleyman; Lauradoux, Cédric; Martin, Benjamin

doi:10.3233/jcs-2010-0408

Cited by 81 publications

(134 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Due to our formalization, we prove (contrary to the statements of [2]) that the three types of fraud are independent. Also, [31] shows a formal approach, but against honest provers only and without specifying security goals.…”

Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 71%

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A Formal Approach to Distance-Bounding RFID Protocols

Dürholz

Fischlin

Kasper

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

103

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Abstract. Distance-Bounding identification protocols aim at impeding man-in-themiddle attacks by measuring response times. There are three kinds of attacks such protocols could address: (1) Mafia attacks where the adversary relays communication between honest prover and honest verifier in different sessions; (2) Terrorist attacks where the adversary gets limited active support from the prover to impersonate. (3) Distance attacks where a malicious prover claims to be closer to the verifier than it actually is. Many protocols in the literature address one or two such threats, but no rigorous cryptographic security models -nor clean security proofs-exist so far. For resource-constrained RFID tags, distance-bounding is more difficult to achieve. Our contribution here is to formally define security against the above-mentioned attacks and to relate the properties. We thus refute previous beliefs about relations between the notions, showing instead that they are independent. Finally we use our new framework to assess the security of the RFID distance-bounding scheme due to Kim and Avoine, and enhance it to include impersonation security and allow for errors due to noisy channel transmissions.

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Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 71%

“…Avoine et al [2] already laid a concurrent groundwork; our approach here is more formal and rigorous, based on the common game-based notion in cryptography. Due to our formalization, we prove (contrary to the statements of [2]) that the three types of fraud are independent.…”

Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Formal Approach to Distance-Bounding RFID Protocols

Dürholz

Fischlin

Kasper

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

103

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“…Clearly, the jth iteration has τ correct responses with probability bounded by Tail(w j , τ − n + w j , 1 2 ). If w j ≥ ⌈ n 2 ⌉, this is bounded by Tail(⌈ n 2 ⌉, τ − ⌊ n 2 ⌋, 1 2 ).…”

Section: Theorem 19 (Dh-resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on ρ, we construct a binary tree T of depth ns in which a node at depth q corresponds to the selection of c q . We denote by G(c|c 1 …”

Section: Lemma 14 (Straightline Extractor) Under the Assumption Thatmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sound Proof of Proximity of Knowledge

Vaudenay

2015

Provable Security

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Abstract. Public-key distance bounding schemes are needed to defeat relay attacks in payment systems. So far, only five such schemes exist, but fail to fully protect against malicious provers. In this paper, we solve this problem. We provide a full formalism to define the proof of proximity of knowledge (PoPoK). Protocols should succeed if and only if a prover holding a secret is within the proximity of the verifier. Like proofs of knowledge, these protocols must satisfy completeness, soundness (protection for the honest verifier), and security (protection for the honest prover). We construct ProProx, the very first sound PoPoK.

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From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols

Avoine

Boureanu

Gerault

et al. 2021

Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems

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We present the concept of relay attacks, and discuss distance-bounding schemes as the main countermeasure. We give details on relaying mechanisms, we review canonical distance-bounding protocols, as well as their threat-model (i.e., covering attacks beyond relaying) stemming from the authentication dimension in distance bounding. Advanced aspects of distance-bounding security are also covered. We conclude by presenting what we consider to be the most important challenges in distance bounding.

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A framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding protocols

Cited by 81 publications

References 43 publications

A Formal Approach to Distance-Bounding RFID Protocols

A Formal Approach to Distance-Bounding RFID Protocols

Sound Proof of Proximity of Knowledge

From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols

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