A game‐theoretic model for users' participation in ephemeral social vehicular networks

Esmaeilyfard, Rasool; Hendessi, Faramarz; Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein; Großklags, Jens

doi:10.1002/dac.3998

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…In recent years, NEGM has been widely used in the application of multiagent systems. For example, Esmaeilyfard et al [31] developed a game-theoretical model to analyze user participation in ephemeral social vehicular networks. Al-Dhanhani et al [17] employed a multiagent game model to discuss human cooperation in social applications under four circumstances (e.g., traditional Tit for Tat with fixed history, the generous Tit for Tat, reputationbased Tit for Tat, and group reputation-based Tit for Tat).…”

Section: Modeling User Participation Through An Evolutionarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism of User Participation in Co-creation Community: A Network Evolutionary Game Method

Zhang

Cao

2021

Complexity

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Active participation closely associates with the sustainable operation of co-creation communities. Different from recent studies on the promotion of sustainable operation by identifying the internal and external motivations of user participation, this paper aims to analyze the mechanism regarding how different motivations affect the decision of user participation from group-level perspective. To better understand the mechanism, internal and external motivations are, respectively, captured by return-cost analysis and user interactive network. Afterwards, a network evolutionary game model was formulated to analyze the dynamic strategy selection (e.g., active participation and passive participation) of all users. In addition, the stable equilibrium and evolutionary path of strategies are analyzed through computational experiments. Results indicate the following: (a) Rewards have an influence on the promotion of active participation. However, with the continued growth of rewards, this promotion does not make sense sustainably. (b) The promotional effect of information noise on the selection of active participation can be found when passive participation is the dominant strategy. However, the inhibitory effect can be seen in populations that mainly adopt active participation. (c) The scale-free feature of user interactive network inhibits the selection of active participation when active participation is the dominant strategy in populations. Results found here is beneficial for managers to implement the specified policies and thus to achieve the sustainability of co-creation community.

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Section: Modeling User Participation Through An Evolutionarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism of User Participation in Co-creation Community: A Network Evolutionary Game Method

Zhang

Cao

2021

Complexity

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“…Otherwise, the incentives lead to many random votes in the game, which might spoil the result of cooperation. This point is mostly overlooked in the above literature, and [27] that studied the role of nodes' incentives in order to contribute to ephemeral social networks. Fourth, we consider that both benign nodes and malicious nodes can take part in the voting game.…”

Section: Novelties and Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(21) and(27), respectively. Based on the values of φ i s, if c gm ≥ c a + (2α − 1) w + δc gm , then the left column in Fig.12({A, NA}) strictly dominates the right column ({NA, NA}).…”

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confidence: 99%

Misbehavior Detection in Ephemeral Networks: A Local Voting Game in Presence of Uncertainty

Behfarnia

Eslami

2019

IEEE Access

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Emerging short-lived (ephemeral) connections between wireless mobile devices have raised concerns over the security of ephemeral networks. An important security challenge in these networks is to identify misbehaving nodes, especially in places where a centrally managed station is absent. To tackle this problem, a local voting-based scheme (game) in which neighboring nodes quickly decide whether to discredit an accused (target) node in mobile networks has been introduced in the literature. However, nodes' beliefs and reactions significantly affect the outcome of target node identification in the collaboration. In this paper, a plain Bayesian game between a benign node and a target node in one stage of a local voting-based scheme is proposed in order to capture uncertainties of nodes for target node identification. In this context, the expected utilities (payoffs) of players in the game are defined according to uncertainties of nodes regarding their monitoring systems, the type of target node and participants, and the outcome of the cooperation. Meanwhile, incentives are offered in payoffs in order to promote cooperation in the network. To discourage nodes from abusing incentives, a variable-benefit approach that rewards each player according to the value of their contribution to the game is introduced. Then, possible equilibrium points between a benign node and a malicious node are derived using a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) and a mixed-strategy BNE, ensuring that no node is able to improve its payoffs by changing its strategy. Finally, the behavior of malicious and benign nodes is studied via simulations. Specifically, it is shown how the aforementioned uncertainties and the designed incentives impact the strategies of the players and, consequently, the correct target-node identification.

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“…On the other hand, users' participation in mobile crowdsensing networks is often voluntary due to using battery resources or exposure to threats such as privacy issues [9]. Therefore, one of the main challenges of mobile crowdsensing networks is encouraging users to participate [10]. Therefore, attracting users' participation is a vital factor for the success of information transmission in this type of network [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Incentive Mechanism for Data Delivery in Mobile Crowdsensing Based on D2D Communications

Esmaeilyfard,

Gharechahi

2023

Journal of Sensors

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Mobile crowdsensing systems employ crowd smartphones to collect data using these device-embedded sensors. The increase in the number of users and the data volume has limited the possibility of using cellular networks. In this regard, collector users need to be able to send their data to the publishers with less delay using device-to-device (D2D) communication. This paper proposes an incentive mechanism for improving the transmission rate to multiple publishers in mobile crowdsensing networks based on device-to-device communication. Users exchange their data for delivering it to interested publishers in this mechanism. Users receive credits for their contributions to data delivery from collector users. Also, the cheque concept has been introduced to facilitate collector users’ payment of this credit. Communication between users is expressed as a cooperative two-player game. A heuristic approach finds the solution to this game. A cheque and credit exchange process is also planned as an online auction to increase credit circulation in the network. Finally, the performance of the proposed mechanism is evaluated using the simulator. The results show that this mechanism performs better than other methods in average delay and delivery rate and has a stable traffic overhead.

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A game‐theoretic model for users' participation in ephemeral social vehicular networks

Cited by 4 publications

References 50 publications

Mechanism of User Participation in Co-creation Community: A Network Evolutionary Game Method

Mechanism of User Participation in Co-creation Community: A Network Evolutionary Game Method

Misbehavior Detection in Ephemeral Networks: A Local Voting Game in Presence of Uncertainty

An Incentive Mechanism for Data Delivery in Mobile Crowdsensing Based on D2D Communications

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