A game-theoretical model of private power production

Xing, Weiguo; Wu, F.F.

doi:10.1016/s0142-0615(00)00059-4

Cited by 20 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The term (w À c y ) in Eq. (2) is an avoided cost mentioned by Xing and Wu [24] in which the public power plant escapes by purchasing the renewable power for resale instead of building a new plant. It consists of the capital cost and operating cost of the foregone power plant.…”

Section: The Model Set-upmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Generation expansion planning (GEP) determines which kind of power plants should be constructed and when they should start to operate [25]. In recent years, because of energy shortages, many governments have encouraged private enterprises to build independent power plants [24]. Independent power producers (IPPs) can sell the electricity power to the traditional fossil fuel power plant.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An analysis of a feed-in tariff in Taiwan’s electricity market

Chang

Han

2013

International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems

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Section: The Model Set-upmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An analysis of a feed-in tariff in Taiwan’s electricity market

Chang

Han

2013

International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems

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“…Theories, including game theory, bargaining theory, or BLP, have been widely employed to analyze resource allocation, price determination, wage determination, Stackelberg's Duopoly Model for economic policies or BOT projects, and other problems (Wen and Hsu 1991, Adams et al 1996, Houba 1997, Lim 1999, Strand 2000, Xing and Wu 2001, Aloysius 2002. According to previous research on bargaining theory or BLP mentioned above, these authors have made some assumptions about their models in terms of number of players, competent information, rational behavior, bargaining cost, and time value.…”

Section: Assumptions Used In Model Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Yang and Meng (2000) explored the toll scheme of highway networks using BLP under the BOT mechanism. Xing and Wu (2001) used BLP to construct a Stackelberg game model for determining the price and production quantity of a power utility in a BOT project. Shen et al (2007) used Bargaining Game Theory to identify the concession period of a BOT project.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using bi-level programming to analyze the royalty for private–public partnership projects: the operational quantity-based model

Kang

Feng

Kuo

2010

Transportation Planning and Technology

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2010) Using bilevel programming to analyze the royalty for private-public partnership projects: the operational quantity-based model, Transportation Planning and Technology, 33:3, 315-328, This paper develops a royalty negotiation model based on the operating quantity of Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) projects for both government and the private sector using a bi-level programming (BLP) approach. The royalty negotiation is one of many critical negotiation items of a concession contract. This study develops a royalty negotiation model to simulate the negotiation behavior of two parties, and derives the heuristic algorithm for the BLP problem. A number of factors are incorporated into this algorithm including the concession rate, the time value discount rate, the learning rate, and the number of negotiations. The paper includes a case study of the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project. The results show that the two parties involved completed royalty negotiation at the sixth negotiation stage. The findings show that the government can receive a royalty from the concessionaire, calculated at 0.00386% of the operating quantity of this BOT project. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model developed here could be employed to explain negotiation behavior.

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“…Recently, some of researches have adopted game theory or bi-level programming approaches to determine the price and the operation quantity level, or to identify concession period of a BOT project [6,7,8]. [6] proposed a build-operate -transfer concession model (BOTCcM) to identify a specific concession period which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two concerned parties in engaging a BOT contract.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Royalty negotiation model for BOT projects: A Bi-level programming approach

Kang

Feng

Kuo

2008

2008 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

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This study develops the royalty negotiation model of BOT (Build, operate, and transfer) projects for government and private sector by Bi-level programming approach. There were few studies to explore the royalty negotiation about BOT projects; however, the royalty negotiation is one of many critical negotiation items of concession contract. This study not only develops royalty negotiation model for BOT projects, but also develops the heuristic algorithm for the Bi-level programming problem. The factors of concession rate, time value discount, learn rate and number of negotiation are incorporated into this algorithm. In addition, this paper conducted a case study with the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project by the LINGO and MATLAB programming. Results show that two parties finish the royalty negotiation at the 6 th negotiation and the profit index of concessionaire is 1.0621; the government finance recovery rate is 11.689. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model herein developed could be applied to explain the negotiation behavior.

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A game-theoretical model of private power production

Cited by 20 publications

References 9 publications

An analysis of a feed-in tariff in Taiwan’s electricity market

An analysis of a feed-in tariff in Taiwan’s electricity market

Using bi-level programming to analyze the royalty for private–public partnership projects: the operational quantity-based model

A Royalty negotiation model for BOT projects: A Bi-level programming approach

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