2020
DOI: 10.1109/access.2020.2983092
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A Misbehaving-Proof Game Theoretical Selection Approach for Mobile Crowd Sourcing

Abstract: With the tremendous advances in ubiquitous computing, mobile crowd sourcing (MCS) has become an appealing part of the Internet of Things (IoT). In MCS systems, workers collect data with a certain quality, and get incentivized in return. However, MCS systems are vulnerable to misbehaving acts such as workers submitting multiple false or fake reports using multiple devices to affect the majority vote of the task. In addition, workers may try to maximize their profit by submitting multiple truthful data, a behavi… Show more

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Cited by 17 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…The prevention techniques against false data injection attacks are also important for the success of mobile crowdsensing. We can use these techniques, such as in References [53][54][55], to select reliable participants who contribute to maximizing the quality of mobile crowdsensing.…”
Section: Incentive Mechanism and Trustworthiness For Mobile Crowdsensingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The prevention techniques against false data injection attacks are also important for the success of mobile crowdsensing. We can use these techniques, such as in References [53][54][55], to select reliable participants who contribute to maximizing the quality of mobile crowdsensing.…”
Section: Incentive Mechanism and Trustworthiness For Mobile Crowdsensingmentioning
confidence: 99%