A Multi-stage Dynamic Incentive Model for Construction Project Managers From the Perspective of Work-Family Conflict

Abstract

This study aims to design incentives for organizations to improve the work engagement of construction project managers (CPMs) when they experience work-family conflict. Methods: Based on principal-agent theory, a multistage dynamic incentive model for CPMs' work engagement under the perspective of work-family conflict is constructed by integrating contract and reputation effect incentive mechanisms. Then MATLAB software was used to simulate the theoretical model for the arithmetic example. Finally, 182 valid questionnaires were tested for the conclusions of the model. Results: In the two stages of the incentive model, work resources significantly positively influence CPMs' work engagement, and work-family conflict harms CPMs' work engagement. Including a reputation mechanism has two effects on the first stage of the incentive model. First, reputation has an incentive effect on CPMs' work engagement. Second, it reduces the negative impact of work-family conflict on work engagement. The combination of contract-and reputation-based incentives will improve CPMs' work engagement. Conclusions: The results suggest that incentives targeted at increasing the work engagement of CPMs may be necessary.