A Population Game Model for the Expansion of Airbnb in the City of Venice

Abstract

The emergence of Airbnb along with an increase in urban tourism has intensified the pressure on urban areas while adding a new dimension to the dynamics of housing distribution, especially in historic cities. These dynamics affect local economies and significantly alter the characteristics of urban spaces, hence the necessity to not only create policies that foster sustainable tourism development but also to advance urban models that explore the relation between Airbnb and the traditional rental and accommodation sector. Through the case of Venice, the present study sheds light on the potential evolution of Airbnb housing in comparison to the traditional rental and homeowner market. In particular, we sought to understand whether a potential equilibrium between these uses exists and if so, at which point in regard to this equilibrium the historic center of Venice is. To tackle this question, methods derived from the field of game theory and specifically evolutionary game theory were used. With the agents (players) being the housing units, the designed theoretical model explored the population dynamics of the housing units in Venice given the three options of homeownership or long-term renting (residential); short term renting or Airbnb (airbnb); and no use (vacant). The findings of our theoretical population game model were validated and discussed with a dataset describing the usage patterns in the city of Venice during the past 20 years. A verification of the outcome through further case studies could eventually provide insights into the future behavior of tourism’s pressure in historic urban areas.

Technologies and proximity spaces: tools for conscious choices in ecological transition

“…8 Questo approccio è stato di recente utilizzato per calcolare l' evoluzione dell'uso delle abitazioni a Venezia (Arbara and D' Autilia, 2021), e può essere una metodologia molto efficiente per il dimensionamento degli usi degli spazi di prossimità considerando essi come agenti, i cui comportamenti non condizionano localmente le altre scelte, determinando che il payoff dipenda solo dalle scelte degli opponenti. Dato che nei "population game" i payoff sono definiti come funzioni continue, il rapporto tra costi economici e benefici ambientali può essere un buon criterio quantitativo per misurare quale scelta, individuata secondo gli scenari dei tre ambiti d'intervento, sia più efficace.…”

“…7 The models were elaborated with the software: ENVI-met (current and project microclimatic conditions); Insights of Revit (road frontage shading and surface irradiation); RECON tool ENEA-Laboratorio Smart Cities and Communities (CER); Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCA-DA) (risk forecasting). 8 This approach, which has recently been used to calculate the evolution of housing use in Venice (Arbara and D' Autilia, 2021), can be a very efficient methodology for dimensioning the uses of proximity spaces that consider them as agents, whose behaviour does not locally condition other choices, and the payoff depends only on the choices of the opponents. Since in population games the payoffs are defined as continuous functions, the relationship between economic costs and environmental benefits can be a good quantitative criterion for measuring which choice identified according to the scenarios of the three policy areas is most effective.…”

Research on Decision-Making Based on the Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Tourists, Scenic Spots, and Government

“…Compared with traditional game theory, evolutionary game is based on the bounded rationality of decision makers, and does not require complete information conditions. Therefore, facing the characteristics of asymmetric information in the tourism market, evolutionary game is more consistent with the reality to analyze the behavior of decision makers (Arbara & D'Autilia, 2021). 2.…”