A Practical and Insider Secure Signcryption with Non-interactive Non-repudiation

Sarr, Augustin P.; Seye, Papa B.; Togde, Ngarenon

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-16458-4_24

Cited by 3 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…3. Security assurance of non-repudiation protocols Sarr et al (2019) proposed an identification scheme based on a combination of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm and a strongly unforgeable signature scheme. The scheme is noninteractive, non-repudiation and is shown to be inside secure under the RSA assumption and the random oracle model.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness analysis of extra-gain guilty of a non-repudiation protocol

Guo

2022

Front Inform Technol Electron Eng

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Many traditional applications can be refined thanks to the development of blockchain technology. One of these services is non-repudiation, in which participants in a communication process cannot deny their involvement. Due to the vulnerabilities of the non-repudiation protocols, one of the parties involved in the communication can often avoid non-repudiation rules and obtain the expected information to the detriment of the interests of the other party, resulting in adverse effects. This paper studies the fairness guarantee quantitatively through probabilistic model checking. E-fairness is measured by modeling the protocol in probabilistic timed automata and verifying the appropriate property specified in the probabilistic computation tree logic. Furthermore, our analysis proposes insight for choosing suitable values for different parameters associated with the protocol so that a certain degree of fairness can be obtained. Therefore, the reverse question—for a certain degree of fairness ε , how can the protocol parameters be specified to ensure fairness—is answered.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness analysis of extra-gain guilty of a non-repudiation protocol

Guo

2022

Front Inform Technol Electron Eng

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“…In the scheme from [22], defined over the (RSA based) group of signed quadratic residues J + N , the Sc algorithm requires Exp(J + N , 6) and the Usc algorithm requires Exp(Z N , 3) (we ignore the exponentiation with the RSA public exponent, which is often small and sparse). Unfortunately, the security reduction uses the Forking Lemma, which implies a 1/q H security degradation, where q H is the number of digest queries the attacker issues.…”

Section: Comparison With Other Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In subsequent works [2,13,14,20,22], several insider secure schemes with NINR have been proposed. The designs offer a superior security, compared to the ML or BD schemes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [14], Fan et al propose a signcryption scheme with non-interactive non-repudiation (SCNINR), based on Boneh et al's signature scheme [10], they show to be insider secure under the DBDH assumption, without resorting the RO model. Sarr et al [22] propose, over the group of signed quadratic residues, a SCNINR, based on a signature scheme of their own design, they show to be insider secure under the RSA assumption and the RO model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The basic design principle in the SCNINR schemes from [8,14,19,22], is (i) a Diffie-Hellman (DH) secret derivation, using ephemeral keys from the sender and the receiver's static public key, followed by (ii) an encryption using some part of the derived secret, and (iii) a signature generation, using the sender's private key, on the plain text and some part of the derived DH secret. One may notice also that these schemes assume rather specific groups or have loose security reductions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Computational Diffie–Hellman-Based Insider Secure Signcryption with Non-interactive Non-repudiation

Sarr

Togde

2022

Springer Proceedings in Mathematics &Amp; Statistics

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An important advantage of signcryption schemes compared to one pass key exchange protocols is non-interactive non-repudiation (NINR). This attribute offers to the receiver of a signcrypted ciphertext the ability to generate a non-repudiation evidence, that can be verified by a third party without executing a costly multi-round protocol. We propose a computational Diffie-Hellman based insider secure signcryption scheme with non-interactive non-repudiation. Namely, we show that under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and the random oracle model, our scheme is tightly insider secure, provided the underlying encryption scheme is semantically secure. Compared to a large majority of the previously proposed signcryption schemes with NINR, our construction is more efficient and it does not use any specificity of the underlying group, such as pairings. The communication overhead of our construction, compared to Chevallier Mâmes' signature scheme is one group element.

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An Efficient Generic Insider Secure Signcryption with Non-Interactive Non-Repudiation

Togde,

Sarr

2024

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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A Practical and Insider Secure Signcryption with Non-interactive Non-repudiation

Cited by 3 publications

References 23 publications

Fairness analysis of extra-gain guilty of a non-repudiation protocol

Fairness analysis of extra-gain guilty of a non-repudiation protocol

A Computational Diffie–Hellman-Based Insider Secure Signcryption with Non-interactive Non-repudiation

An Efficient Generic Insider Secure Signcryption with Non-Interactive Non-Repudiation

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