A Relation as the Unifier of States of Affairs

Abstract

This paper is concerned with what I call the ‘problem of unity’ (a cousin of the problem of instantiation). This is the puzzle of how Armstrong‐like states of affairs (instantiations of properties and relations) are unified. The general approach is ‘relational internalism’: the unifier of such a state of affairs is a relation of some sort in it. A view commonly associated with relational internalism is that if such a relation satisfies a certain ‘naive’ expectation to a relation – that it is related to its relata – then Bradley's regress results. As I argue, for one very natural species of relational internalism, this is indeed the case. Influential writers on the topic have therefore maintained that this relation is not related to its relata. But, as we shall see, while this ‘classic’ relational internalism obviously avoids Bradley's regress, intuitively, it fails completely to solve the problem of unity. I argue, however, that given the rejection of a natural, but unfounded, assumption of conventional relational internalism, a unique relation can unify states of affairs without leading to Bradley's regress. I consequently propose a novel version of relational internalism on which states of affairs are unified by such an entity.

Relata-Specific Relations: A Response to Vallicella

“…Way‐out Number Two could still be more appealing to whomever prefers relations not to carry the burden of relating relata by necessity, insofar as it is not R but EX that carries it (cf. Meinertsen 2008). We do not quite see the real gain of this.…”

Estados de cosas y relaciones de fundación

“…Intuiciones en este mismo sentido ya han sido propuestas con anterioridad (cf. Mertz, 1996, 184-195;Meinertsen, 2008;Wieland y Betti, 2008;Maurin, 2011) pero sin introducir relaciones de fundación que hacen la situación teórica mucho más perspicua. Para el caso de un estado de cosas [Ux 1 x 2 …x n t] supóngase un tropo U-en-x 1 , x 2 , …, xn, t. Tal como se ha indicado, debe suponerse que es parte de las condiciones de identidad de tal tropo el ser precisamente la instanciación de U y no de otro universal, y el estar instanciado en x 1 , x 2 , …, x n , t y no otros objetos y otro instante de tiempo.…”

A Neo-Armstrongian Defense of States of Affairs: A Reply to Vallicella

“…It is clear that the argument applies not only to relational facts ordinarily so-called but also to monadic ones since if an individual has a property, and properties are universals, the individual is in some sense or other "related" to the property. Thus for a 3 For other similar statements of the problem see Simons (1994), Maurin (2010), Wieland and Betti (2008), Meinertsen (2008), and Orilia (2006), to name just a few. 4 Note that the sense of "internal" here is different than the customary one.…”

“…If the proponent of the "how relations relate" question is not to be accused of a bias against relations, he needs to offer some preliminary reasons for thinking that an entity whose ontological role is to relate is somehow not up to the task. Without such reasons, the proponent of relating relations can legitimately insist that to ask "how relations relate" in this 11 See Simons (1994), Maurin (2010), Meinertsen (2008), and Wieland and Betti (2008) for such framing of the problem.…”