A Reply to Penner and Rowe

Reshotko, Naomi

doi:10.1163/156852895321051883

Cited by 3 publications

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“…I do not myself adhere to the view that desires and beliefs are two different kinds of entities that equally cause behaviors. Rather, I believe that beliefs are components of desires (Reshotko, 1995(Reshotko, , 1990. The relative merits of these two different theories are not relevant to the present discussion.…”

Section: T W O Foundational Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We might distinguish between true desires and false desire^.^ True desires are An anonymous referee suggested calling these 'derived' desires. However, I (Reshotko 1990(Reshotko , 1995 , following Dretske's 1987, p. 1 1 1 ) use the term 'derived' desire in a highly technical sense in which derived desires are authentichut higher level -desires than basic (proto-desires). On my view, Charles' desire that he drive in the fastest lane is a derived desire.…”

Section: What Charles Desired Was That He Drive In Whichever Lane Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do Explanatory Desire Attributions Generate Opaque Contexts?

Reshotko¹

1996

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A bstract Many philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co-referring expression salva veritate as the objects of non-psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another provide inconclusive evidence when we don't allow for all regular substitutions in psychological contexts. This becomes more obvious when we contextualize intentional behavior within the appropriate framework by recognizing that, in order to make sense of any desire attribution, we must understand the subject experiencing the desire to be pursuing each desired situation as a means to a further overarching goal. I conclude that the object of desire should always be read de re.

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Section: T W O Foundational Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What Charles Desired Was That He Drive In Whichever Lane Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Explanatory Desire Attributions Generate Opaque Contexts?

Reshotko¹

1996

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Socratic Moral Psychology

Brickhouse

Smith

2010

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Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be 'intellectualist' in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until publication of this book, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains why Socrates believed that emotions, desires and appetites can influence human motivation and lead to error. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith defend the study of Socrates' philosophy and offer an alternative interpretation of Socratic moral psychology. Their novel account of Socrates' conception of virtue and how it is acquired shows that Socratic moral psychology is considerably more sophisticated than scholars have supposed.

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Socratic and Platonic Moral Psychology

Brickhouse¹,

Smith²

2014

Ancient Ethics

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A Reply to Penner and Rowe

Cited by 3 publications

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Do Explanatory Desire Attributions Generate Opaque Contexts?

Do Explanatory Desire Attributions Generate Opaque Contexts?

Socratic Moral Psychology

Socratic and Platonic Moral Psychology

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