A U.S. Option Playbook for Contingency Planning to Reclaim Scarborough Shoal

Abstract

T he South China Sea has become a flashpoint for conflict in Asia. This is due, in large part, to the gradual and coercive control exerted by China over the land features, sea, and airspace of this strategic waterway linking Southeast and East Asia. China has done so by (1) employing maritime law enforcement and maritime militia vessels to assert administrative control over disputed territory and waters within its Nine-Dash Line-a vague area delineated by China as constituting the country's claims over virtually all the land features and maritime area of the South China Sea-and (2) denying the use of this area to other claimants, such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and Taiwan. 1 China appears to calculate that using such nonmilitary assets as coast guard vessels, maritime militia, and other civilian maritime actors while keeping People's Liberation Army Navy surface ships over the horizon will enable it to achieve its strategic goals while minimizing the risk of further escalation. 2 This strategy has arguably been quite effective.