Accountability beyond Institutional Rules: How the Corporative Interests Affect the National Councils of Justice and of the Public Prosecutor’s Service in Brazil

Abstract

The article analyzes the design, composition, and normative activity of the National Council of Justice (CNJ) and of the National Council of the Public Prosecutor's Service (CNMP) in Brazil, as explanatory elements of the type of control they exercise over their members. We conducted an inquiry into council member appointment criteria member profiles, and into how these aspects affect the Councils' decisions. For that, we conducted a collective biography of the 203 members of these judicial Councils over the 2005-2019 period and an analysis of the content of the resolutions issued over that same period. We identified the formal rules and informal practices that guide the composition and functioning of these Councils and contend that the combination of these elements leads to a process in which corporatist accountability prevails over democratic accountability. The Brazilian Councils are, therefore, the expression of a symbiosis between accountability institutions and those accountable.