Administrative Decentralization and the Role of Information: The Case of Intimate Partner Violence During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract

The U.S. federal government often devolves administrative processes and decision making to state and local governments. Prior studies have found that the success of decentralization and implementation depends on several mediating factors at the subnational level, such as a state's political ideology or administrative capacity. This study focuses on one mechanism—the ability of states to leverage their information advantage about the local context vis-à-vis the federal government. We are interested in whether the information advantage of state-level firearm background checks decreased the rates of intimate partner violence (IPV) involving a firearm compared to states that relied on federally administered background checks. We take advantage of data from the period of state-mandated stay-at-home (SAH) orders during the COVID-19 pandemic, a temporal context with increased IPV rates. Using a Poisson fixed effects regression, we find that rates of IPV involving a firearm did not increase when the SAH orders were in effect. However, using decision-relevant information in state-administered background checks decreased the rates of IPV resulting in injury and murder-suicide, compared to states that relied on federal background checks.