Adoption is Not Abortion‐Lite

Abstract

It is standardly taken for granted in the literature on the morality of abortion that adoption is almost always an available and morally preferable alternative to abortion -one that does the same thing so far as parenthood is concerned.This assumption pushes proponents of a woman's right to choose into giving arguments that are based almost exclusively around the physicality of pregnancy and childbirth. On the other side of the debate, the assumption that adoption is a real alternative seems to strengthen the contention that a woman who wishes to abort is morally deficient, whatever the status of the foetus: that she is selfish or short-sighted in her refusal to bear the temporary physical burden of pregnancy.In this article, I will argue that adoption is not a genuine alternative to abortion. It does not 'do the same thing', even setting aside the physicality of pregnancy. I will show that on the most successful model of parental obligation -a causal account that formalises the distinction between parent: progenitor, and parent: carer -birth mothers and fathers remain obliged, life-long, to their birth children even when the child is adopted out.

Why and How to Prefer a Causal Account of Parenthood

“…This model would include birth parents (both genetic and nongenetic), as well as gamete recipients, gamete donors, and in some cases, possibly IVF doctors and technicians; but it would exclude, for example, obstetricians and the parents' matchmakers. I have defended an INUS conceptualization of parental causing in Porter ( 2012 ).…”

Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the 'all or nothing problem’

“…This does not mean that adoption, in general, is adoption lite. 39 It most definitely is not because adoption requires the woman to bear the burdens of pregnancy. But things are different when the woman has already accepted to bear those burdens.…”

“…The problem with this objection is that the pregnant woman can avoid burdens of parenthood with adoption—terminating the fetal life is not necessary. This does not mean that adoption, in general, is adoption lite 39. It most definitely is not because adoption requires the woman to bear the burdens of pregnancy.…”

Liberal Equality and the Moral Status of Parent-Child Relationships

“…18 I here refer to the causal view as the conjunct of both these claims; only Nelson explicitly defends both of them, while several other people, including those I mention in what follows, defend only one of them. obligations that procreators have), is defended, among others, by O'Neill (1979), Archard (2010b), andPorter (2012;2014).…”