Air power and the future battlespace

Abstract

since the end of the Second World War, and that these commitments will consume a major proportion of defence resources (1) . Indeed, it is a stated air force planning assumption that it will continue to support land operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in essence, for as long as it takes (2) . However, it is also the paper's contention that we should not focus on counter-insurgency operations to the exclusion of other possible commitments. This paper is intended, in part, to be a corrective to the dangerous line of argumentation appearing after 9/11 which advocated our completely reconfiguring our armed services to meet the terrorist threat. The danger posed by rogue states has not evaporated, and there is still a requirement for strategic effect operations, or at the very least deterrence, against nations which pose a threat to our national security. The paper also aims to redress the balance after a decade of viewing air power very largely as a supporting component in the joint environment. The paper also seeks to challenge the accepted wisdom that joint means land supported by maritime and air. The nature of a conflict or whatever the scenario determines which Service environment is dominant, and this can change over time. In short, we must be able to operate effectively across the full military spectrum, from peace support operations (PSO), through to counter-insurgency (COIN), to 'high end' war-fighting.Given Britain's financial constraints, we cannot afford to recapitalise the RAF in the foreseeable future, and so we must think harder about how we utilise what assets we have. This does not mean purely thinking about which platforms can perform what variety of roles, but it entails a fundamental step change in air power conceptualisation in