Analogue Computation and Representation

Maley, Corey J.

doi:10.1086/715031

Cited by 44 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Indeed, on a number of standard accounts of physical computation, computational processes are perspicuously (i.e. informatively, non-circularly) defined over representational vehicles (cf Fodor 1981;O'Brien and Opie 2009;Maley 2021a). 30 This clearly implies that computational processes and representational vehicles are distinct: the representational vehicles are the primitives used to de ne computational processes, and computational processes consist in the (rule-based) manipulation of vehicles.…”

Section: -Activation Spacesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution

Facchin

2023

Synthese

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Neural structural representations are cerebral map-or model-like structures that structurally resemble what they represent. These representations are absolutely central to the "cognitive neuroscience revolution", as they are the only type of representation compatible with the revolutionaries' mechanistic commitments. Crucially, however, these very same commitments entail that structural representations can be observed in the swirl of neuronal activity. Here, I argue that no structural representations have been observed being present in our neuronal activity, no matter the spatiotemporal scale of observation. My argument begins by introducing the "cognitive neuroscience revolution" ( §1) and sketching a prominent, widely adopted account of structural representations ( §2). Then, I will consult various reports that describe our neuronal activity at various spatiotemporal scales, arguing that none of them reports the presence of structural representations ( §3). After having de ected certain intuitive objections to my analysis ( §4), I will conclude that, in the absence of neural structural representations, representationalism and mechanism can't go together, and so the "cognitive neuroscience revolution" is forced to abandon one of its main commitments ( §5).

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Section: -Activation Spacesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution

Facchin

2023

Synthese

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“…The MAC is intended to capture analog computation, but fails to do so. Like most discussions of analog computation, Piccinini (2015) takes analog computers to be distinguished by their use of continuous variables; however, analog computers often used discrete variables, yet were distinct from digital computers (Maley 2023). The right way to characterize analog computers is via their use of analog representation; a distinction between continuous and discrete is not sufficient (Maley 2011).…”

Section: Sketching a Way Forwardmentioning

confidence: 99%

Medium Independence and the Failure of the Mechanistic Account of Computation

Maley

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Current orthodoxy takes representation to be essential to computation. However, a philosophical account of computation that does not appeal to representation would be useful, given the difficulties involved in successfully theorizing representation. Piccinini's recent mechanistic account of computation proposes to do just that: it couches computation in terms of what certain mechanisms do without requiring the manipulation or processing of representations whatsoever (Piccinini 2015). Most crucially, mechanisms must process medium-independent vehicles. There are two ways to understand what "medium-independence" means on this account; however, on either understanding, the account fails. Either too many things end up being counted as computational, or purportedly natural computations (e.g., neural computations) cannot be counted at all. In the end, illustrating this failure sheds some light on the way to revise the orthodoxy in the hope of a better account of computation.

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“…Ulmann (2013) and Papayannopoulos (2020b) offer impressive surveys of analog computation. Maley (2020) provides examples of analog representations-both in artifacts and in the brain-showing that the representations can be discrete or continuous.…”

Section: Others Who Have Linked Computing To Modelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nature of Physical Computation

Shagrir¹

2022

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Computing systems are everywhere today. Even the brain is thought to be a sort of computing system. But what does it mean to say that a given organ or system computes? What is it about laptops, smartphones, and nervous systems that they are deemed to compute, and why does it seldom occur to us to describe stomachs, hurricanes, rocks, or chairs that way? The book provides an extended argument for the semantic view of computation, which states that semantic properties are involved in the nature of computing systems. Laptops, smartphones, and nervous systems compute because they are accompanied by representations. Stomachs, hurricanes, and rocks, for instance, which do not have semantic properties, do not compute. The first part of the book argues that the linkage between the mathematical theory of computability and the notion of physical computation is weak. Theoretical notions such as algorithms, effective procedure, program, and automaton play only a minor role in identifying physical computation. The second part of the book reviews three influential accounts of physical computation and argues that while none of these accounts is satisfactory, each of them highlights certain key features of physical computation. The final part of the book develops and argues for a semantic account of physical computation and offers a characterization of computational explanations.

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Analogue Computation and Representation

Cited by 44 publications

References 38 publications

Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution

Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution

Medium Independence and the Failure of the Mechanistic Account of Computation

The Nature of Physical Computation

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