Analysing the Causation Between Conspiracy Mentality and Conspiracy Beliefs: Potential Pitfalls and Leads to Address Them

Abstract

The dispositional approach to conspiracy mentality suggests that it causally precedes belief in conspiracy theories. I identify two potential pitfalls when analysing this causal relationship: Circular reasoning (in which the two constructs are conflated and interchangeable) and black box explanations (in which conspiracy mentality is merely defined as a disposition to believe in conspiracy theories). I argue that avoiding black box explanations requires theoretical and empirical works to clarify the content and antecedents of conspiracy mentality. To guide future research, I formulate two hypotheses based on a philosophical analysis of conspiracy thinking as well as empirical research. In doing so, I question common assumptions on conspiracy mentality. First, against the assumption that conspiracy mentality is unidimensional, I propose that it may be better conceptualised as a multidimensional construct. Second, against the assumption that conspiracy mentality unidirectionally causes conspiracy theory beliefs, I propose that this relationship might be bidirectional. [Accepted for publication as a research spotlight in Zeitschrift für Psychologie]