And Yet He is a Monist: Comments on James Kreines, Reason in the World

This article is a reply to comments by Franz Knappik and Robert Stern on my book, Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal. Issues addressed include the systematicity of Hegel’s philosophy, the prioritizing of metaphysical over epistemological questions in his arguments, Hegel’s response to Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason, and my conclusion that there are senses in which Hegel’s own position is both ambitiously metaphysical and also monist, but that the monism present there is epistemological, and the ambitious metaphysics is non-monist.

Section: Knappik and Many Monismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Knappik and Many Monismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Knappik and Many Monismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Knappik and Many Monismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Fundamentality without Metaphysical Monism: Response to Critics of Reason in the World

Kreines¹

2016

“… 2 Knappik (2016) and Bowman (2017) pursue these worries, in light of multiple texts touching on Spinoza and monism.…”

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confidence: 99%

Spinoza, Kant and the Transition to Hegel’s Subjective Logic: Arguing For and Against Philosophical Systems

Kreines¹

2018

Hegel’s Logic argues in a manner that is supposed to support a systematic philosophy. But it is difficult to explain how such a systematic argument is supposed to work. For answers, I look to the key transition from the Doctrine of Essence to the Doctrine of the Concept. Here we find discussions of both Spinozist and Kantian systems of philosophy: both are supposed to be helpful, and yet also to be lacking in instructive ways. So the initial hope is that these comparisons can help us to understand Hegel’s own systematic argument, and what it means to transition from an objective to a ‘Subjective Logic’. But the comparisons bring additional difficulties. First, to defend a comprehensive system involves refuting rivals, and the discussion of Spinoza demonstrates that refutation is difficult. Second, it is hard to see how any argument for Hegel’s system could be akin to those in Spinoza and Kant given the extent of the differences between them. I argue that the best way to deal with these difficulties is to explain the systematic argument of the Logic as modelled on the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant’s first Critique.

Hegel and Arguments for Natural Kind Essentialism

Knappik¹

2018

Self Cite

Natural Kind Essentialism (NKE) is the view that the objects of sciences like physics, chemistry and biology fall into natural kinds, and that such kinds have essences—sets of properties possession of which is necessary and sufficient for kind-membership. Since Putnam and Kripke brought NKE back onto the philosophical agenda, it has found many advocates. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of how this view can be positively motivated. After illustrating the current need for an argument for NKE through critical discussions of Putnam’s, Kripke’s and Ellis’s arguments for NKE, this article aims to show that Hegel offers the resources for an original argument for the view. This argument works by deriving metaphysical implications from an account of what it means to understand an explanandum.