Anti-Eavesdropping by Exploiting the Space–Time Coupling in UANs

Abstract

Due to the space–time coupling access, we find that anti-eavesdropping opportunities exist in underwater acoustic networks (UANs), where packets can be successfully received only by the intended receiver, but collide at the unintended receivers. These opportunities are highly spatially dependent, and this paper studies the case that linearly deployed sensor nodes directly report data toward a single collector. We found an eavesdropping ring centered around these linearly deployed sensor nodes, where the eavesdropper could steal all the reported data. Since the typical receiving-alignment-based scheduling MAC (TRAS-MAC) will expose the relative spatial information among the sensor nodes with the collector, the eavesdropper can locate the eavesdropping ring. Although moving the collector into the one-dimensional sensor node chain can degrade the eavesdropping ring to a point that constrains the eavesdropping risk, the collector’s location will be subsequently exposed to the eavesdropper. To efficiently protect the reported data and prevent the exposure of the collector’s location, we designed a slotted- and receiving-alignment-based scheduling MAC (SRAS-MAC). The NS-3 simulation results showed the effectiveness of the SRAS-MAC and the TRAS-MAC in protecting data from eavesdropping, which protect 90% of the data from eavesdropping in the one-eavesdropper case and up to 80% of data from eavesdropping in ten-eavesdropper cases. Moreover, unlike TRAS-MAC, which will expose the collector’s location, SRAS-MAC provides multiple positions for the collector to hide, and the eavesdropper cannot distinguish where it is.