Anti-exceptionalism about logic

Hjortland, Ole Thomassen

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0701-8

Cited by 107 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…The anti-exceptionalist will need a solution to the problem either way. 25 Upshot 4: Idealization and natural language According to logical predictivism, logical theories offer generalizations about which natural language arguments are valid. However, some authors have warned that natural languages-and our judgements about their validity-are too irregular to allow for the sweeping generalizations contained in most logical theories (cf.…”

Section: Upshot 3: the Background Logic Problem As Was Highlighted Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical Predictivism

Martin

Hjortland

2020

J Philos Logic

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Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and (at least partially) prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation.

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Section: Upshot 3: the Background Logic Problem As Was Highlighted Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical Predictivism

Martin

Hjortland

2020

J Philos Logic

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“…There is, of course, the issue of identifying these speech acts, and arguing for their mutual independence. Francez (), for instance, considers generalizing bilateralism to multilateralism, but he does not specify attitudes beyond the first three ( doubt being the third). The fourth one would have to be a sort of tolerant assertion, compatible with denial, like in Cobreros et al ().…”

Section: Proof Theory For Knotmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not a Knot

Teijeiro

2020

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Here, I examine the connective called Knot, which may be considered a threat to semanticists, but not to inferentialists. I argue that it constitutes a problem for neither, by showing, first, how to characterize it proof‐theoretically, and second, by showing how the issues it allegedly poses for the semanticist rest on an imprecise understanding of metainferences. I conclude that one should be careful in grounding philosophical disputes merely on formal tools.

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“…Here, your evidential situation supports the false belief about rationality because you are exercising your cognitive faculties well. Had you exercised them less well, you may not have followed the arguments, and so likely would have avoided acquiring evidence for the false belief 30 See (Hjortland 2017;Lewis 2004b;Maddy 2002;Priest 2016;Quine 1951;Russell 2015Russell , 2014Williamson 2007Williamson , 2013aWilliamson , 2013bWilliamson and Armour-Garb 2017). 31 Even if anti-exceptionalist accounts of logic turn out to be incorrect in claiming that logic theories can be justified abductively, it may still be that abductive arguments are good enough evidence for non-experts.…”

Section: Indefeasibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See(Woods 2019a, b) for an articulation of this worry.37 Whether it does is complicated, for discussion see(Hjortland 2017;Woods 2019a). …”

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confidence: 99%

Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality

Field

2020

Acta Anal

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I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires. Specifically, I argue that, as for other topics, one’s total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about this. Despite being prima facie innocuous, a number of philosophers have recently denied this. Some have argued that the facts about what rationality requires are highly dependent on the agent’s situation and change depending on what that situation is like (Bradley, Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(3). 2019). Others have argued that a particular subset of normative truths, those concerning what epistemic rationality requires, have the special property of being ‘fixed points’—it is impossible to have total evidence that supports false belief about them (Smithies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(2). 2012; Titelbaum 2015). Each of these kinds of exceptionality permits a solution to downstream theoretical problems that arise from the possibility of evidence supporting false belief about requirements of rationality. However, as I argue here, they incur heavy explanatory burdens that we should avoid.

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Anti-exceptionalism about logic

Cited by 107 publications

References 30 publications

Logical Predictivism

Logical Predictivism

Not a Knot

Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality

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