Applying Confirmation Theory to the Case against Neurolaw

Abstract

Neurolaw is the emerging research field and practice of applying neuroscientific knowledge to legal standards and proceedings. This new intersection of neuroscience and law has put up some serious claims, the most significant of which is the overall transformation of the legal system as we know it. The claim has met with strong opposition from scholars of law, such as Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson, who argue that neurolaw (and neuroscience more generally) is conceptually wrong and thus perceive most of it as "nonsense". In response, Sarah Robins and Carl Craver have shown why we may dismiss Pardo and Patterson's arguments as irrelevant to the actual practice of neurolaw, and Neil Levy has claimed that neurolaw is in fact not conceptually confused. I propose a different approach to the problem, exposing a flaw in Pardo and Patterson's arguments by means of confirmation theory. A similar approach has been used by Christopher Clarke in vindication of neuroeconomy. My main point is that Pardo and Patterson use implicit hypotheticodeductivism in their attack on neurolaw, and that we have good reasons to doubt the employment of such a model. Hypothetico-deductivism faces great, even insurmountable problems of a theoretical nature. I then demonstrate how the alleged problems associated with neurolaw disappear if we use a less problematic Bayesian model of confirmation. I also explain why the proposed probabilistic model provides a better account for the way the legal system actually works. In conclusion I argue that if Pardo and Patterson were right, the law would require a greater amount of transformation in the future than it requires on account of present day neuroscience. Scientific Criteria of Humanitarian Knowledge and Structure of Theory of LawIgor Nevvazhay, Philosophy, Saratov State Law Academy, Saratov, RUSSIAN FEDERATION For the first time distinction between natural sciences and human sciences was fixed by Neo-Kantians (W. Windelband, H. Rickert, and W. Dilthey). Contemporary development of humanities is connected with creation of multitude of competing theories. However we don't have yet clear beliefs about models of creation of humanitarian theories, and about a structure and functions of humanitarian theoretical knowledge. Display of specific character of humanitarian theoretical knowledge is still the actual problem. In the process of solution of this task I use the assumption that a structure, functions and scientific criteria of knowledge are connected with each other. Such scientific criteria as subjectness,