Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky? Electoral outcomes of Mexico's certification program

Janvry, Alain de; Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco; Sadoulet, Élisabeth

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.04.003

Cited by 71 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…A small literature in economics and political science (Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito, 2011; De La O, 2013; de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro, and Sadoulet, 2014) has studied voter reactions to development programs, while a separate literature (e.g., McIntosh et al, 2014) has examined how such programs crowd out public sector investment. In this paper, we show that both perspectives and both types of data are required to understand the mechanisms underlying the changes in political actions and attitudes, as well as their full welfare implications.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention

Guiteras

Mobarak

2015

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Comprehensive evaluation requires tracking indirect effects of interventions, such as politicians and constituents reacting to the arrival of a development program. We study political economy responses to a large scale intervention in Bangladesh, where 346 communities consisting of 16,600 households were randomly assigned to control, information or subsidy treatments to encourage investments in improved sanitation. In one intervention where the leaders' role in program allocation was not clear to constituents, leaders react by spending more time in treatment areas, and treated constituents appear to attribute credit to their local leader for a randomly assigned program. In contrast, in another lottery where subsidy assignment is clearly and transparently random, the lottery winners do not attribute any extra credit to the politician relative to lottery losers. These reactions are consistent with a model in which constituents have imperfect information about leader ability. A third intervention returns to a random subset of treated households to inform them that the program was externally funded and randomly assigned. This simple, scalable information treatment eliminates the excess credit that leaders received in villages that received subsidies. These results suggest that while politicians may respond to try to take credit for development programs, it is not easy for them do so. Political accountability is not easily undermined by development aid.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention

Guiteras

Mobarak

2015

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“…Secondly, the transaction frequency also affects the transaction costs. This study selects [30] d proxy variables for characterizing transaction frequency, which included land fragmentation, land consolidation, land circulation intermediary, convenience stores in village, well-planned roads, and household assets, such as motor vehicle and mobile phone [35]. It was worth mentioning that land fragmentation led to higher transaction costs in the land rental market [36], and the number of land parcels captured the transaction costs due to higher transaction frequency [37].…”

Section: Model Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Affects Participation in the Farmland Rental Market in Rural China? Evidence from CHARLS

Wang

2019

Sustainability

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Land fragmentation and the small size of land parcels are still the major bottlenecks for agriculture sustainable development in rural China, and an efficient land rental market could consolidate land plots and realize agricultural management at a moderate scale. However, transaction cost is still the main obstacle of land transfer. It is, therefore, essential to reduce the excessive transaction costs in the process of transfer; the primary task is to identify the roots of transaction costs. In order to accurately identify the sources of transaction costs, a generalized ordered Logit model with thresholds that allowed transaction costs to affect different directions of land transfer was developed using the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey in 2015. The results suggested that the roots of transaction costs presented significant differences regarding the supply and demand of cropland. For the supply of land, the land titling program, land transfer intermediaries, and well-planned roads were the three most important factors that reduced transaction costs. For the demand of land, the three critical measures for reducing the transaction costs were well-planned roads, land consolidation, and the land titling program. The government should continue to push forward the land titling program and land consolidation projects in rural China, especially in hilly and mountainous areas. The infrastructure that greatly restricted agricultural development should be improved at a moderate level and the system of land circulating intermediary services at the township level should be established.

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“…Beyond the household-level impacts, there are a number of important municipal and higher-level policy impacts that may result from land administrative programs. First, land reforms may have a significant impact on political preferences (Castañeda Dower and Pfutze, 2015;de Janvry et al, 2014b). Possible mechanisms may include lower dependence of poor rural households on local elites, support for the party that led the intervention or a greater participation in the market economy (and, likely, support for pro-market parties).…”

Section: Political Support Increased Tax Base and Land Use Planningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of land administration programs on agricultural productivity and rural development: existing evidence, challenges and new approaches

Gignoux¹,

Macours²,

Wren‐Lewis³

2012

RAEStud

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Investment in land administration projects is often considered key for agricultural productivity and rural development in developing countries. But the evidence on the effect of such interventions is remarkably mixed. This article reviews the literature and discusses a number of challenges related to the analysis of the impacts of land administration programs, focusing on developing countries where the starting position is one of land administration systems based on the Napoleonic code, with existing individual rights that may be imperfect and insecure. We examine a set of conceptual and methodological challenges including: 1. a conceptual challenge related to the need to unbundle property rights and to establish the plausible causal chain for land administration interventions; 2. the existence of other binding constraints on productivity, implying the need to consider heterogeneities in policy impacts and the complementarity between property rights and other productive interventions; 3. the need to account for spillover effects of land interventions on non-targeted households; and 4. methodological challenges related to the causal identification of the impacts of such interventions.

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Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky? Electoral outcomes of Mexico's certification program

Cited by 71 publications

References 14 publications

Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention

Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention

What Affects Participation in the Farmland Rental Market in Rural China? Evidence from CHARLS

Impact of land administration programs on agricultural productivity and rural development: existing evidence, challenges and new approaches

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