Are There Passive Desires?

Wall, David G.

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01187.x

Cited by 18 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The concept of deformed desires helps in the analysis of such desires wherein a woman uses her own autonomy to give up her autonomous choices. Desires also are motivational states (Wall 2009) in that they develop as instrumental causes for self-expression.…”

Section: Reflections Of Desire As Instrumental Causesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Desire and Self-Representation: A Philosophical Reading of the Malayalam Novelette “Agnisakshi”

Kumar

Menon

2016

J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the focus on the concepts of desire and self-representation, in this paper we present a philosophical analysis of the Malayalam novelette ''Agnisakshi'' by Lalithambika Antharjanam, which narrates the customs and taboos that existed in the Namboothiri community in Kerala in the early twentieth century. Through a method of narrative analysis supplemented by philosophical reflections, the study brings forth the living conditions of Brahmin women in the Namboothiri society in Kerala and their self-representations in the text. Engaging with the characters of the novelette, we discuss desire and agency in the light of the larger narrative of the text, and how the psychosocial factors influence them. One of the conclusions we arrive at, analysing the tensions between patriarchy and female individuality, is that it is important to understand the psychological formation of desires and its philosophical transformations. The study depicts desire and self-representation as two important concepts, and the understanding of the relation between them as crucial, in the formation of personal identity.

show abstract

Section: Reflections Of Desire As Instrumental Causesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Desire and Self-Representation: A Philosophical Reading of the Malayalam Novelette “Agnisakshi”

Kumar

Menon

2016

J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For a contemporary defender, seeWall (2009). I reject the idea that a disposition to act is a necessary condition for hope.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear

Palmqvist

2023

Can. J. of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I provide a unified account of hope and fear as propositional attitudes. This “mirror account” is based on the historical idea that the only difference between hope and fear is the conative attitude involved, positive for hope and negative for fear. My analysis builds on a qualified version of the standard account of hope. The epistemic condition is formulated in terms of live possibility and the conative according to a non-reductive view on desire and aversion. The account demonstrates the theoretical fruitfulness of accepting Jack M. C. Kwong’s distinction between hope and fear as propositional attitudes and experiential states.

show abstract

Aristotle on What Emotions Are

Pearson

2024

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This book provides the first systematic interpretation of what Aristotle thinks occurrent emotions are and points to some philosophical merits of his account. It is argued that he holds that emotions are representational pleasures or distresses that are formed in response to other intentional states that apprehend their objects. Even this bare formulation of his view is notable in several respects. First, the idea that the pleasures or distresses of emotions are representational—directed at objects in the world (or ourselves)—contrasts sharply with accounts that identify emotions with non-representational sensations or feelings. Second, the notion that emotions are pleasurable or distressful responses to other intentional states that apprehend their objects provides a fundamental contrast with many current accounts which instead view emotions as (in part) modes of apprehension or kinds of epistemic state themselves. Third, Aristotle’s view stands in opposition to motivational accounts of emotions, insofar as while he thinks that emotions interact with desires or motivational states in important ways, he does not think they are themselves (even in part) motivational states. They are representational pleasures or distresses alone. Together, these three points give Aristotle a novel understanding of the representational role emotions play; namely, neither descriptive, nor prescriptive, but reactive. Besides developing these ideas, both textually and philosophically, the book also explores how Aristotle individuates emotion types; his understanding of the material dimension of emotions; and how his view can provide a novel explanation of recalcitrant emotions, a notoriously problematic phenomenon for many recent accounts of emotions.

show abstract

Are There Passive Desires?

Cited by 18 publications

References 45 publications

Desire and Self-Representation: A Philosophical Reading of the Malayalam Novelette “Agnisakshi”

Desire and Self-Representation: A Philosophical Reading of the Malayalam Novelette “Agnisakshi”

The Mirror Account of Hope and Fear

Aristotle on What Emotions Are

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About