“…the introduction; Levinson ; Sharpe , throughout and esp. 321; Shelley ; Pratt , ). But if artistic value is attributive goodness, it is not so clear that this is right.…”
Section: What Follows If Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Budd , 1) What would separate a distinctively artistic value from other sorts of value? (Pratt , 591)If there is … a properly artistic sort of value. (Huddleston , 705)The practices of making and responding to art are partly defined by the distinctive kind of value to which they are directed: artistic value as opposed to economic, prudential, cognitive, and so on value.…”
Section: What Follows If Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…George Dickie (), in a book‐length investigation into the nature of artistic value, begins by identifying what he takes to be an exhaustive list of the possible theories of artistic value. Tellingly, all of them take its determinants to be valuable properties (see also Stecker , 260–261, ; Goldman , 45; Pratt , 591–592).…”
Section: What Follows If Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moderate value skepticism might be thought to also supply a motivation for rejecting robust realism about artistic value in the same way as the arguments above about moral goodness and beauty (Pratt , 592–593). However, if artistic value is attributive goodness, such an argument would be unsuccessful.…”
Section: Realismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is sometimes assumed that the same kind of argument can be made against realism about artistic value (see, for example, Goldman ; Railton ; Bender , 82–84; S. Davies , 32; Pratt , 592–593; Eldridge , 170–171). However, if artistic value is attributive goodness, as I have argued, such an argument would be unsuccessful.…”
It is common to distinguish between attributive and predicative goodness. There are good reasons to think that artistic value is a kind of attributive goodness. Surprisingly, however, much debate in philosophical aesthetics has proceeded as though artistic value is a kind of predicative goodness. As I argue, recognizing that artistic value is attributive goodness has important consequences for a number of debates in aesthetics.
“…the introduction; Levinson ; Sharpe , throughout and esp. 321; Shelley ; Pratt , ). But if artistic value is attributive goodness, it is not so clear that this is right.…”
Section: What Follows If Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Budd , 1) What would separate a distinctively artistic value from other sorts of value? (Pratt , 591)If there is … a properly artistic sort of value. (Huddleston , 705)The practices of making and responding to art are partly defined by the distinctive kind of value to which they are directed: artistic value as opposed to economic, prudential, cognitive, and so on value.…”
Section: What Follows If Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…George Dickie (), in a book‐length investigation into the nature of artistic value, begins by identifying what he takes to be an exhaustive list of the possible theories of artistic value. Tellingly, all of them take its determinants to be valuable properties (see also Stecker , 260–261, ; Goldman , 45; Pratt , 591–592).…”
Section: What Follows If Artistic Value Is Attributive Goodness?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moderate value skepticism might be thought to also supply a motivation for rejecting robust realism about artistic value in the same way as the arguments above about moral goodness and beauty (Pratt , 592–593). However, if artistic value is attributive goodness, such an argument would be unsuccessful.…”
Section: Realismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is sometimes assumed that the same kind of argument can be made against realism about artistic value (see, for example, Goldman ; Railton ; Bender , 82–84; S. Davies , 32; Pratt , 592–593; Eldridge , 170–171). However, if artistic value is attributive goodness, as I have argued, such an argument would be unsuccessful.…”
It is common to distinguish between attributive and predicative goodness. There are good reasons to think that artistic value is a kind of attributive goodness. Surprisingly, however, much debate in philosophical aesthetics has proceeded as though artistic value is a kind of predicative goodness. As I argue, recognizing that artistic value is attributive goodness has important consequences for a number of debates in aesthetics.
Experientialism in aesthetics is the view that the artistic merit or the aesthetic value of something is determined by the final value of certain experiences of it. These are usually specified as experiences of it with understanding and appreciation. Until recently, experientialism was the dominant view. Not anymore. Experientialists are now subject to a barrage of objections, many of which they have not answered. Here I argue that all of these objections fail. I develop a new form of experientialism that is immune to them. It also has an independent rationale.It incorporates an account of the value of art appreciation that is plausible in its own right. And it endorses many of the core insights of anti-experientialists, especially concerning the final value of good art. Those of us unconvinced by experientialism need to take this form of it seriously. I conclude by identifying some genuine problems it faces. Even these aren't clearly insoluble.
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