Asymmetric information control for stochastic systems with different intermittent observations

Qi, Qingyuan; Qiu, Zhenghong; Wang, Xianghua; Ji, Zhijian

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2021.126544

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 28 publications

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“…Shang [35] introduced a novel multiplex network presentation for directed graphs and their associated connectivity concepts, including pseudo-strong connectivity and graph robustness, which provide a resilience characterization in the presence of malicious nodes. Qi et al [36] investigated the linear quadratic (LQ) control problem for a stochastic system with different intermittent observations. However, the goal of such literature on networked system theory is not to establish a general information asymmetry cooperative game theory.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Asymmetric Cooperative Game with Agreements Implemented by a Third Party

Chen

2024

Contemp. Math.

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This paper introduces asymmetric information into the analysis of cooperative games with agreements implemented by a third party and establishes theoretical models of a one-time information asymmetric cooperative game with agreements implemented by a third party for the first time, using the methodology proposed in previously done research studying coalition formation and cooperative payoff distribution. In an information asymmetric cooperative game with agreements implemented by a third party, players may retain their own private information, and make decisions through their virtual games on the basis of their own information sets. This paper defines the virtual cooperative games of the players and demonstrates the equilibrium of the virtual cooperative game of a player; proposes the condition for the existence of the coalition equilibrium in an information asymmetric cooperative game with agreements implemented by a third party, defines and provides the existence proof of this coalition equilibrium when it does exist; defines the public choice game of a coalition on the strategic combination choice in a certain coalition situation, defines and provides the existence proof of the equilibrium of this game; examines the condition for the existence of the bargaining game on the distribution of the cooperative payoff of a coalition, defines and provides existence proof of the bargaining game, when the coalition members are allied or unallied in the bargaining game.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%