Australian perspective on engaging with South Korea in the Indo‐Pacific

Abstract

How do the US allies engage with other actors in the US-led Indo-Pacific security order? This article examines this question in the case of Australia. We argue that the regional strategic network is a key consideration for Australia to facilitate its interaction with a target country in the Indo-Pacific. This article analyzes Australia's approach toward South Korea as an example demonstrating the significance of the regional strategic network in shaping Australia's diplomacy. It does so by addressing the following three questions.First, what is Australia's vision for the Indo-Pacific? Second, how does Australia perceive South Korea's role in the Indo-Pacific? Third, how does Australia's Indo-Pacific vision find the relevance of South Korea for Australia's security interests? The article elucidates that Australia's view on South Korea's place in the Indo-Pacific security network influences Australia's interaction with South Korea and consequently plays an integral part in the US-led regional security orderbuilding process.

A relational approach to Indo‐Pacific strategies: South Korea's role in a networked regional architecture

“…Great potential exists for United Kingdom–South Korea relations as both countries seek to identify reliable partners and strengthen regional networks. However, as Kim writes, “An important factor in the trajectory of United Kingdom–South Korea relations will be the extent to which South Korea can clarify its own geopolitical orientation, including how it grapples with issues linked to China's rise and willingness to participate in groupings such the Quad Plus” (Kim, 2023, p. xx).…”

“…Different actors including Japan, India, Australia, United States, ASEAN, and the United Kingdom have formulated different Indo‐Pacific strategies that either align more tightly or loosely with other regional players. For instance, as Jagannath Panda (2023) and Jiye Kim (2023) note, some actors such as India and Australia, respectively, are actively participating in forging coalitions such as the Quad. Still others are tightening relations with Indo‐Pacific partners beyond the United States as attested by emerging trilaterals (e.g., India, Australia, United Kingdom; India, Japan, Australia).…”

“…(3) How relevant is South Korea within Australia's Indo‐Pacific vision with regard to its own policy development? As Kim argues, Australia's perception of South Korea's place in the Indo‐Pacific regional network “influences Australia's bilateral interaction with South Korea and consequently plays an integral part in the US‐led regional security order building process” (Kim, 2023).…”

“…Saeme Kim addresses the UK's Indo‐Pacific tilt by building bilateral and multilateral partnerships in the region. As Kim notes, United Kingdom–South Korea relations are positive, but “limited at the bilateral level” (Kim, 2023). Great potential exists for United Kingdom–South Korea relations as both countries seek to identify reliable partners and strengthen regional networks.…”

Recalibrating South Korea's role and regional network in the Indo‐Pacific: An analysis from a network‐centered approach

“…The two governments are making strides to improve relations without resolving pending issues such as wartime forced labor and persuading their respective constituencies, not to mention numerous historical issues such as comfort women and history textbook controversies that rather limit their efforts. However, without improving bilateral relations with Japan, it might be difficult for Seoul to expand their network in the Indo‐Pacific region, considering the extensive regional network in which Japan is involved, especially in the case of the Quad (Plus) (Kim, 2023). This is more so, given that Japan believes South Korea has been an unreliable partner, as South Korea's foreign policy has been inconsistently conducted with its changing ruling parties of different ideological orientation (Koga, 2023).…”