Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law

Abstract

Since the early 1970s a considerable number of multilateral agreements have been concluded in the environmental field that establish a common pattern of institutional arrangements. The purpose of these arrangements is to develop the normative content of the regulatory regime established by each agreement1 and to supervise the states parties’ implementation of and compliance with that regime. These institutional arrangements usually comprise a conference or meeting of the parties (COP, MOP) with decision-making powers, a secretariat, and one or more specialist subsidiary bodies. Such arrangements, because of their ad hoc nature, are not intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the traditional sense. On the other hand, as the creatures of treaties, such conferences and meetings of the parties, with their secretariats and subsidiary bodies, add up to more than just diplomatic conferences. Because such arrangements do not constitute traditional IGOs and yet are freestanding and distinct both from the states parties to a particular agreement and from existing IGOs, we have chosen to describe them as “autonomous.” They are also autonomous in the sense that they have their own lawmaking powers and compliance mechanisms.

Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence

“…Should such trade-offs be the subject of national standards? Autonomous Weapons Can lethal autonomous weapons be made to comply with humanitarian law (Churchill and Ulfstein 2000)? If, as some organizations have suggested, autonomous weapons should be banned (Docherty 2012), is it possible to develop a precise definition of autonomy for this purpose, and can such a ban practically be enforced?…”

A World Environment Organization

“…Yet it is the MEAs that have been the most innovative feature of the environment regime. A recent study in the American Journal of International Law provides a comprehensive review of the techniques of rulemaking, decisionmaking, and compliance review in MEAs, and characterizes these developments as "unique" within international organization and law (Churchill & Ulfstein, 2000). Indeed, the significance of this development leads the authors to devise a new name for the way MEAs work: the authors call them "autonomous institutional arrangements."…”

Possibilities of enhancing co-operation and co-ordination among MEAs in the biodiversity cluster

“…In some cases, the secretariat functions have been designated in the MEAs themselves (Churchill and Ulfstein 2000). For example, Article 12 of CITES determines that the Executive Director of UNEP shall provide a Secretariat.…”