Back to the Future? Thoughts on the Political Economy of Expanding State Ownership in Russia

Tompson, William

doi:10.1057/9780230282940_4

Cited by 26 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…It has been estimated that state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed Russian firms (Deloitte, 2015). Although the Russian state has emphasized that the privatization continues (Tompson, 2008), Djankov (2015) comments that the Russian state since 2003 has turned its privatization policy around and increased its control of sectors considered to be of strategic importance, such as finance, energy, transportation and media. According to Chernykh (2008), the control by the Russian state is often opaque, as only direct ownership is typically reported.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complex state ownership, competition, and firm performance – Russian evidence

Liljeblom

Maury

Hörhammer

2019

IJOEM

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Purpose -State ownership has been common especially in industries with restricted competition. In Russia, state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed firms (Deloitte, 2015). Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding the effects of various forms of government control in listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the impact of the complexity of state ownership and competition on the performance of Russian listed firms. Design/methodology/approach -The sample consists of data for 72 firms (360 firm-years) in the Russian MOEX broad market index during 2011-2015. The complexity of state ownership is captured by studying forms of state control including majority/minority, direct/indirect, federal/regional, mixed structures and golden shares. Findings -The authors find significant differences in performance relating to different forms of state ownership. State control is negatively related to firm valuation and the sales/employees ratio. Performance is weakest when state ownership takes the form minority, regional or direct ownership. State control through golden shares typically outperforms other state-controlled firms. The authors find indications of employment prioritization beyond the economical optimum. In addition, the relation between state ownership and profitability becomes positive in sectors where state firms appear to enjoy lower competition. Originality/value -While the effects of state ownership have been studied on many markets, there is a lack of studies on the effects of different forms, or the complexity, of state ownership beyond direct and indirect ownership. The authors contribute to the literature on the performance effects of state ownership by studying a multitude of forms of governmental ownership as well as the role of competition in Russia. Especially the profitability of state-controlled firms is significantly affected by industry characteristics. Implications of the results are discussed both from firm and policy maker perspectives.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complex state ownership, competition, and firm performance – Russian evidence

Liljeblom

Maury

Hörhammer

2019

IJOEM

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“…Oligarchs did their utmost to maximize the short-term value of assets. The main explanation for such behaviour lay in the insecurity of private property rights (Tompson 2008;Hedlund 2001). They failed to fulfil their functional role in reducing uncertainty in an institutional context marked by the absence of the rule of law and other institutions capable of complementing and securing such rights.…”

Section: From the Constitution Of A Private Oligopoly To The Emergencmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russian energy companies and the Central and Eastern European energy sector

Rossiaud¹,

Locatelli²

2018

Understanding Energy Security in Central and Eastern Europe

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This contribution sets out to clarify the determinants and modalities by which Russian companies played a part in structuring the energy complex of central and eastern European countries. In so doing we seek to supplement state-centred analysis of realist inspiration. The Soviet legacy explains both the incentive for Russian companies to develop operations in downstream oil and gas in these countries and why, given the vulnerability of national energy systems, target countries tend to see such developments as a threat to their security. In this respect the mid-2000s may be seen as a turning point, with the downstream growth strategies of Russian energy suppliers increasingly called into question. JEL Q41 ; Q48

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“…La question de la sécurisa-tion des droits de propriété privés en Russie a fait l'objet d'un vaste débat (Tompson, 2008 ;Runov, 2004 ;Hedlund, 2001) (Tarr & Thomson, 2003 ;Dubek et al, 2006). Ces prix (qui ne sont pas des prix de monopole) répondent à une logique de redistribution entre les consommateurs et à la politique industrielle qu'entend mener l'État russe.…”

Section: -La Question Des Droits De Propriétéunclassified

Les enjeux de sécurité dans la relation gazière UE-Russie

Locatelli¹

2013

rei

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La sécurité gazière de l’Union européenne émerge depuis le début des années 2000 comme un élément clé de sa politique énergétique. Les relations contractuelles basées sur les contrats de long terme durant les années 1970 et 1980 ont produit une relative stabilité dans les échanges énergétiques entre l’UE et ses fournisseurs gaziers. Mais depuis le milieu des années 1990, le processus d’ouverture à la concurrence des industries gazières de l’UE ainsi que la volonté de créer un marché unique du gaz conduisent à des réorganisations en profondeur de ce secteur. Dans ce contexte, l’UE entend redéfinir la gestion de ses relations avec ses principaux fournisseurs en tentant d’imposer son « modèle » basé sur la concurrence, la dé-intégration des entreprises de réseau et la privatisation. Le « modèle de l’UE » n’est pas celui que la Russie tend à mettre en œuvre dans son secteur gazier en dépit d’importants changements. La logique basée sur l’utilisation privilégiée d’un instrument étatique s’oppose au multilatéralisme et aux principes concurrentiels de l’UE qui prônent l’ouverture, la dé-intégration voire la privatisation du secteur gazier. Le pouvoir normatif de l’UE se trouve ainsi en contradiction avec l’environnement institutionnel du secteur énergétique russe.

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Back to the Future? Thoughts on the Political Economy of Expanding State Ownership in Russia

Cited by 26 publications

References 10 publications

Complex state ownership, competition, and firm performance – Russian evidence

Complex state ownership, competition, and firm performance – Russian evidence

Russian energy companies and the Central and Eastern European energy sector

Les enjeux de sécurité dans la relation gazière UE-Russie

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