Baking and slicing the pie: An application to the airline alliance's profit-sharing based on cooperative game theory

Yea, Minyoung; Kim, Daeki; Cheong, Taesu; Moon, Joon; Kang, Sungho

doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2022.102219

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Unlike competing with others [ 39 ], agents in cooperative games aim to solve a common task or maximizing the overall payoff to collaborate with each other. Therefore, from this perspective, the MCA problem can also be considered a profit-sharing problem in cooperative games [ 40 ], for which various methods such as the Shapley method [ 41 ], the core [ 42 , 43 ], Nash bargaining [ 43 ], and bankruptcy [ 44 , 45 ] have been suggested for. One of the methods used to allocate resources when they are limited and there are many applicants is the bankruptcy method [ 45 ]; this happens when the available resources are less than what is requested by the applicants.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Agent Credit Assignment and Bankruptcy Game for Improving Resource Allocation in Smart Cities

Yarahmadi

Shiri

Challenger

et al. 2023

Sensors

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In recent years, the development of smart cities has accelerated. There are several issues to handle in smart cities, one of the most important of which is efficient resource allocation. For the modeling of smart cities, multi-agent systems (MASs) can be used. In this paper, an efficient approach is proposed for resource allocation in smart cities based on the multi-agent credit assignment problem (MCA) and bankruptcy game. To this end, the resource allocation problem is mapped to MCA and the bankruptcy game. To solve this problem, first, a task start threshold (TST) constraint is introduced. The MCA turns into a bankruptcy problem upon introducing such a constraint. Therefore, based on the concept of bankruptcy, three methods of TS-Only, TS + MAS, and TS + ExAg are presented to solve the MCA. In addition, this work introduces a multi-score problem (MSP) in which a different reward is offered for solving each part of the problem, and we used it in our experiments to examine the proposed methods. The proposed approach is evaluated based on the learning rate, confidence, expertness, efficiency, certainty, and correctness parameters. The results reveal the better performance of the proposed approach compared to the existing methods in five parameters.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Agent Credit Assignment and Bankruptcy Game for Improving Resource Allocation in Smart Cities

Yarahmadi

Shiri

Challenger

et al. 2023

Sensors

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“…Our research is related to airline revenue management which is widely studied in the existing literature. The literature on airline revenue sharing focuses on booking system design [35], capacity sharing [36][37] and revenue sharing mechanisms [38][39][40]. The most related to our work is the transfer price between the operating airline and the marketing airline.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Strategy for Airline Code-Share Agreements – A Comparative

TENG,

TANG

2024

PROMTT

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Members of marketing airline alliances cooperatively book seats from the operating airline and compete with each other in the market. This paper models and discusses two types of bargaining pricing processes: representative-based and agent-based cooperative bargaining. It also considers the internal negotiation mechanism within the marketing airline alliance for representative-based bargaining. Using a cooperative bargaining approach, the effects of marketing airline mergers in code-share agreements with the operating airline are analysed. The performance of two sub-strategies under representative-based bargaining is compared with the non-cooperative case. The study concludes that representative-based bargaining without internal negotiation intensifies competition, while representative-based bargaining with internal negotiation has the opposite effect. Cooperative bargaining with internal negotiation benefits both the marketing airlines and the operating airline, whereas representative-based bargaining without internal negotiation may result in a total profit loss. The choice of which bargaining strategy to adopt depends on the bargaining power and the substitutability of different market airline brands. This research provides the basis and support for the formulation of pricing strategies in airline alliances' code-sharing.

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