BCmECC: A Lightweight Blockchain-Based Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for Internet of Things

Abstract

In this paper, targeting efficient authentication and key agreement in an IoT environment, we propose an Elliptic Curve Cryptography- (ECC) based lightweight authentication protocol called BCmECC which relies on a public blockchain to validate the users’ public key to provide desired security. We evaluate the security of the proposed protocol heuristically and validate it formally, which demonstratse the high level of the security. For the formal verification we used the widely accepted formal methods, i.e., BAN logic and the Scyther tool. In this paper we also analyse the security of recently proposed blockchain-based authentication protocols and show that this protocol does not provide the desired security against known session-specific temporary information attacks in which the adversary has access to the session’s ephemeral values and aims to retrieve the shared session key. In addition, the protocol lacks forward secrecy, in which an adversary with access to the server’s long-term secret key can retrieve the previous session keys, assuming that the adversary has already eavesdropped the transferred messages over a public channel in the target session. The proposed attacks are very efficient and their success probability is `1’, while the time complexity of each attack could be negligible. Besides, we show that BCmECC is secure against such attacks.

Blockchain-Based Identity Management System and Self-Sovereign Identity Ecosystem: A Comprehensive Survey

“…Lansky et al [126] formulate a lightweight authentication system based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) named BCmECC. It depends on a public blockchain to confirm the users' public key and provides the needed security.…”

“…ECC cryptography is often seen as a natural modern successor to the RSA cryptosystem, as it requires fewer keys and signatures to achieve the same level of security as RSA and enables swift key generation, key agreement, and signatures. Several studies [9], [126], [163], [178] have adopted this scheme for the authentication of digital identity in their proposed BC-based IDMS.…”

“…Three types of attacks are used in impersonation: passive, active, and simultaneous [209]. Strong identification and authorization scheme are needed to resist this attack in blockchain and several studies have addressed this attack in their proposed system [7], [10], [15], [20], [126], [138], [153], [156], [158], [178]. Ao et al [156] utilize IBC and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem techniques and formulated a mathematical structure that prevents the impersonation attack.…”

“…As a result, the blockchain is partitioned into two instances: one that runs the inherited version of the software and another that runs the upgraded version. Several studies e.g., [7], [15], [19], [20], [116], [126], [129], [150], [156], [210] have addressed this replay attack for resistance in their proposed BC-based IDMS solution. Ao et al [156] devise a system where the challenge number and the private key are random in each authentication process.…”

“…Therefore, the message signatures and authentication information are different each time, preventing replay attacks. Lansky et al [126] formulate a system where the cryptographic keys are a factor of the timestamp at a specific time t1. The eavesdropped message cannot be used at any later time t2, hence preventing the replay attack in the system.…”