Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests

Ghosh, Abheek; Goldberg, Paul W.

doi:10.1145/3580507.3597777

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2024

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“…Besides, the lottery contests with multi-prize is discussed in (Fu, Wu, and Zhu 2022). Additionally, the best response dynamics of contestants is investigated by (Ewerhart 2017;Ghosh and Goldberg 2023). Colonel Blotto Games Colonel Blotto Games (Borel 1921) characterize the competition between two players across several contests (aka., battle-fields), which has some similarity to the game among contestants in our model.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition among Pairwise Lottery Contests

Deng,

Gan,

et al. 2024

AAAI

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We investigate a two-stage competitive model involving multiple contests. In this model, each contest designer chooses two participants from a pool of candidate contestants and determines the biases. Contestants strategically distribute their efforts across various contests within their budget. We first show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) for the contestants, and propose a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme to compute an approximate PNE. In the scenario where designers simultaneously decide the participants and biases, the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) may not exist. Nonetheless, when designers' decisions are made in two substages, the existence of SPE is established. In the scenario where designers can hold multiple contests, we show that the SPE always exists under mild conditions and can be computed efficiently.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%