Beyond Consociational Theory: Identity in Northern Ireland and Brussels

Jarrett, Henry

doi:10.1080/13537113.2016.1239446

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…In considering patterns of ethnic group representation in a divided society, we focus on the 'regional consociation' in Brussels (Bodson & Loizides, 2017;Cochrane et al, 2018;Jarrett, 2016;Lijphart, 1981;Wolff, 2004), established on the basis of pacification between the Dutch and the French language communities (Deschouwer, 2012;Janssens, 2018aJanssens, , 2018b.…”

Section: Pol I T Ica L R Epr E Se N Tat Ion I N T H E Bc Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Importantly, Brussels voters are free to choose their language group at each election (Deschouwer, 2012; Pilet, 2005). When fielding candidates, however, parties are obliged to designate their linguistic affiliation (as either Dutch or French speaking), and this choice is irreversible (Deschouwer, 2012; Jarrett, 2016).…”

Section: Political Representation In the Bcrmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to Blanckaert et al (2021), French‐speaking parties in Brussels effectively attract votes from Dutch‐speaking voters, while Dutch‐speaking parties receive electoral support from Francophone voters. Brussels parties strive to secure victories within their respective language groups by appealing to voters who identify with the other language group, all while maintaining their core electorate (Jarrett, 2016; Pilet, 2005). In this regard, Dutch‐speaking parties have an especially strong incentive to reach out to the significantly larger Francophone group and position themselves as representatives of their interests.…”

Section: Political Representation In the Bcrmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Power‐sharing institutions in Brussels thus create a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the PR electoral system institutionally motivates MPs to advance co‐ethnolinguistic group interests in parliament, and to appeal to co‐ethnolinguistic voters (cf., Chandra, 2005; Jarrett, 2016). On the other hand, the very same institutions allow for cross‐ethnolinguistic electoral behavior.…”

Section: Political Representation In the Bcrmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In such a context, it is expected that MPs will be more likely to bypass ethnicity (Fox, 2023), in contrast to cases where the divisions run deeper, and the context is less favorable. Therefore, we would expect regions with more pronounced ethnic divisions to exhibit higher levels of ethnic representation (Jarrett, 2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do birds of a feather flock together? Patterns of ethnolinguistic group representation in the Brussels Capital Region

Blanckaert

Caluwaerts

2023

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Consociational democracy is commonly discussed through the assumed premise of co‐ethnic group representation whereby representatives are institutionally incentivized to represent co‐ethnic interests. However, little attention has been paid to the process of group representation in consociations, in particular the link between descriptive and substantive ethnic group representation. This article considers representative claim‐making on behalf of ethnolinguistic groups in the Brussels Capital Region (Belgium), which is politically divided into Dutch and French speakers. Brussels constitutes an interesting case, because while we would expect co‐ethnic claim‐making to be the norm, Brussels MPs also receive electoral incentives to make representative claims on behalf of the other ethnolinguistic group (i.e., cross‐ethnic claim‐making). Based on a quantitative analysis of representative claims in parliamentary documents (2009–2019) from the Brussels Parliament, we find that cross‐ethnic claim‐making remains limited compared to co‐ethnic claim‐making, and that Dutch speakers and ethnic outbidders are more likely to speak on behalf of co‐ethnics.

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