Beyond Decentralization--The Comparative Study of Interdependence in Federal Systems

Bolleyer, Nicole; Thorlakson, Lori

doi:10.1093/publius/pjr053

Cited by 50 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Where a reduction in self-rule is offset by increasing shared rule, interactions between both levels do not necessarily become either more decentralized (states acquiring a stronger voice in how the center is run 9 ) or more centralized (states agreeing to surrender certain powers to the central government in exchange for policy benefits and resources 10 ) but, rather, more interdependent. 11 Conversely, decentralization implies an increase in self-rule properties of the states. Thus, the trio of concepts-centralization, decentralization, and interdependence-constitutes the analytical core that can be applied to the study of center-state interactions in the three dimensions identified above.…”

Section: Conceptualizing Center-state Relations In a Time Of Party Symentioning

confidence: 99%

Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

Sharma¹,

Swenden²

2018

INPP

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2 of counterinsurgency, in Nagaland and Kashmir, he asserts that ideological penetration of the "politics of conflict resolution" has profoundly affected counterinsurgency operations in both theaters. Where ideological penetration is high, the state has evinced a willingness to accept the logic of ballots; where it is weak, the logic of ballots has been made subservient to the logic of bullets. AbstractFor the first time since 1984, the 2014 general elections handed a majority in the Lok Sabha to a single party. This article provides a critical assessment of what the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party has meant for the dynamics of center-state relations in India. In doing so, the article first engages with the concept of "competitive-cooperative federalism" and more widely with a framework that allows us to locate shifts in center-state relations across three dimensions: the political, the fiscal, and the administrative. Overall, we argue that despite the BJP's promise to put "center-state relations on an even keel" these relations have become more centralized under the Prime Ministership of Narendra Modi. At the same time, this process of centralization has not been uniform across the three identified dimensions: centralization is strongest in the political domain, but weakest in fiscal matters, where the central government felt bound by the recommendations of the XIV Finance Commission and by longstanding intergovernmental discussions on overhauling India's complex indirect taxation system with a polity-wide Goods and Services Tax, the management of which relies on center-state consent.

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Section: Conceptualizing Center-state Relations In a Time Of Party Symentioning

confidence: 99%

Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

Sharma¹,

Swenden²

2018

INPP

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“…Various forms of interdependence in multilevel systems complicate vertical relations between levels of governments. Constitutional methods of the allocation of power can affect the autonomy of levels of government in practice (Marks, Hooghe and Schakel, ; Bolleyer and Thorlakson, ). Political behaviour can also produce and sustain interdependencies between levels.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Linkages in Federal Systems: Barometer Voting and Economic Voting in the German Länder

Thorlakson

2016

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Federal systems create political competition at multiple territorial levels. While models of vertical bargaining conceptualise federal-subnational relations as occurring between parties with exogenously defined interests, federalism also structures forms of interdependence between the federal and subnational levels. Political competition in multi-level systems is marked by interdependence between the federal and subnational levels through barometer and second order voting effects. Findings of a more 'autonomous' form of political competition at the subnational level, through state-level economic voting, are less common. This article examines Germany, a highly interdependent federation, to assess the extent to which voting in Land elections responds to Land level economic performance and whether political and institutional factors affect this. I find evidence that in Land level elections, voting for the federally incumbent party is responsive to federal economic performance. Alongside this, there is evidence of 'uncoupled' electoral behaviour at the Land level, with Land level economic voting. This is enhanced by single party government.

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“…Various, often more encompassing concepts have been advanced to describe institutional incentives for policy coordination, including shared-rule, cooperative federalism and interdependence (Elazar 1991;Manow 2005;Hooghe et al 2010;Bolleyer & Thorlakson 2012). Decentralisation does not necessarily co-vary with policy coordination (Elazar 1985;Hooghe et al 2010;Bolleyer & Thorlakson 2012). In a principle component analysis of characteristics of decentralised systems, Hooghe et al (2010) identify two empirically separate dimensions: self-rule, which captures the degree of authority that subnational governments obtain over their own territory as a consequence of decentralisation; and shared-rule, which refers to the authority that subnational governments exercise collaboratively over the country as a whole.…”

Section: Institutional Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Policy coordination refers to the extent to which governments at different levels are incentivised 'to operate in a mutually coordinated manner' (Bolleyer & Thorlakson 2012: 569). Various, often more encompassing concepts have been advanced to describe institutional incentives for policy coordination, including shared-rule, cooperative federalism and interdependence (Elazar 1991;Manow 2005;Hooghe et al 2010;Bolleyer & Thorlakson 2012). Decentralisation does not necessarily co-vary with policy coordination (Elazar 1985;Hooghe et al 2010;Bolleyer & Thorlakson 2012).…”

Section: Institutional Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The theoretical motivation for focusing on exchanges among members of the executive branch is based on the intergovernmental arrangements (IGAs) literature. Comparative analyses of IGAs show that highly institutionalised relations between members of regional executives encourage them to adopt common policy stances (Bolleyer & Thorlakson 2012;Bolleyer 2006). In addition to the executive control dimension, I examine the other sub-dimensions of the RAI's shared-rule component, including regional representation in national lawmaking.…”

Section: Expectations and Measurement Of Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

Kleider

2017

European J Political Res

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This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.

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Beyond Decentralization--The Comparative Study of Interdependence in Federal Systems

Cited by 50 publications

References 15 publications

Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

Electoral Linkages in Federal Systems: Barometer Voting and Economic Voting in the German Länder

Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

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