Bullwhip effect and complexity analysis in a multi-channel supply chain considering price game with discount sensitivity

Ma, Junhai; Lou, Wandong; Tian, Yi

doi:10.1080/00207543.2018.1526420

Cited by 58 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Farmers are users of low-carbon agricultural technologies. Farmers' adoption of low-carbon innovative technologies is essential for promoting the development of low-carbon agriculture [52][53][54][55][56]. For the farmers, the main determinant of low-carbon technology adoption is the profitability and feasibility of greenhouse gas emission reduction measures.…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

2020

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Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation.

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Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

2020

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“…On the one hand, the more frequently the members and capable person communicate and exchange out of respect, the more they are likely to understand each other, and the mutual trust level will be higher with increasing closeness between them, which can further strengthen cooperation between the two sides, avoid the friction problems because of distrust, and finally improve the governance performance of agricultural cooperatives [35,36]; the improvement of communication frequency can increase the level of information sharing to a certain extent, which may reduce the risk caused by asymmetry and incomplete information, and finally, it is beneficial to solve the problems of internal governance [8,37,38]; the more they are likely to discuss a problem together, such as the problem of the production and marketing of agricultural products, the more they are likely to solve the problem or improve the efficiency of solving problem through effective consultation ultimately [39][40][41][42][43].…”

Section: E Mediating Effect Of Relational Embeddednessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…e members are willing to share the heterogeneous information because of the incentive of being respected, which can weaken the problem of internal information Complexity asymmetry and provide a new opportunity for the development of agricultural cooperatives. If the members' internal status can be recognized, they will actively make contribution to the future of agricultural cooperatives to a certain extent and help the capable person overcome the problems and difficulties in the agricultural cooperatives [41][42][43][44][45][46][47].…”

Section: E Mediating Effect Of Relational Embeddednessmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Model and Complexity Analysis of the Relationship Based on Organizational Justice and Embeddedness Theories

Zhang

Guo

2020

Complexity

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In capable person governing agricultural cooperatives, the internal governance is essential for cooperatives to achieve sustainable development. As an important mechanism of cooperative internal governance, relational governance is the focus of the current research in the field of cooperative internal governance. Based on the theory of organizational justice, relational embeddedness theory, and relational governance theory, this paper constructs the relationship between interactive justice, relational embeddedness, and governance performance based on fuzzy cognitive map and discusses the influence mechanism of interactive justice on relational governance performance. Taking 245 members of 18 agricultural cooperatives as samples, this paper makes an empirical test by using the machine learning method. Through the analysis of the data, we find that interactive justice has a significant positive impact on the governance performance. Relational embeddedness also has a significant positive impact on the governance performance. And relational embeddedness plays an intermediary role in the positive impact of interactive justice on governance performance. To some extent, the research results broaden the relationship between interactive justice and relational governance performance and provide useful reference for cooperatives to strengthen internal governance and achieve sustainable growth.

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“…In the existing differential economic system, there are three types of expectation rules [25,26,27]: the bounded rational expectation, the naive expectation, and the adaptive expectation. e bounded rational expectation has the strongest complex characteristics, followed by adaptive expectations, and the last is naive expectations which do not have complex characteristics when used alone.…”

Section: Chaos Control Based On Mixed Expectationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Dynamic and Complexity of Energy-Saving Investment about Multichannel and Multienergy Supply Chain

2020

Complexity

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Considering the multienergy structure of the electricity market and supply-side competition reform in China, a dual-channel and multiproduct supply chain model is constructed. There are three players in the game model: new energy company and traditional energy company provide energy for the market and the State Grid at the same time. The State Grid is a retailer who buys electricity from two companies and supplies to the market after converting and transmitting the power. Three companies can invest in grid management for saving energy and reducing losses. The energy loss rate is an exponential function of line loss investment. Through the bifurcation graph, Lyapunov exponent, and the basin of parameter, the complex characteristics of the investment market are analyzed. It is interesting to find the Grazing–Hopf bifurcation which usually occurs in nonlinear circuits. The mixed expectation of bounded rationality and the naive expectation is conducive to suppressing the bifurcation and chaos of the market. When external shocks occur, the control model has good robustness.

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Bullwhip effect and complexity analysis in a multi-channel supply chain considering price game with discount sensitivity

Cited by 58 publications

References 36 publications

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

A Model and Complexity Analysis of the Relationship Based on Organizational Justice and Embeddedness Theories

Research on Dynamic and Complexity of Energy-Saving Investment about Multichannel and Multienergy Supply Chain

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