Business modes in the sharing economy: How does the OEM cooperate with third-party sharing platforms?

Li, Yongjian; Bai, Xuanming; Xue, Kelei

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.08.002

Cited by 59 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…If the value perception factor was low and the marginal cost was high, the manufacturer should not cooperate with any sharing platform. At the same time, the manufacturer coordinated supply-demand matching through the homogeneity of consumer usage [33]. The difference was that our research considered the impact of consumer heterogeneity on the manufacturer's sharing services and focused on coordinating the supply-demand matching of the sharing market via the availability of sharing products.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manufacturer’s Sharing Servitization Transformation and Product Pricing Strategy

Liu

Jian

2021

Sustainability

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The sharing market includes the idle product sharing by the owner and the firm’s new product sharing. Companies participating in the sharing economy choose to withdraw from the market because it is always difficult to make a profit, due to heavy asset investment, but there is no such worry for owners who do not need cost input. At the same time, we have observed that the sharing products launched by companies are difficult to meet the rental needs of consumers. Based on the above findings, we have constructed a model where there is a market where a monopolistic manufacturer sells and rents out at the same time, and owners who purchased new products can choose to rent out products when they are idle. Because of the uncoordinated supply and demand matching of the sharing market and the excessively high unit cost input, our research found that: (1) the barriers for the manufacturer to enter the sharing market are always high—for example, the manufacturer will choose to enter the sharing market only when consumers have a high rate of availability of sharing products. Only when the cost of products in the sharing market is not low will the manufacturer choose to provide sharing services; (2) the competition between the two products in the sharing market weakens the demand cannibalize in the sales market; (3) the manufacturer enters the sharing market to promote the owner’s income. The owner’s earnings will increase with the rising of sharing products’ availability.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manufacturer’s Sharing Servitization Transformation and Product Pricing Strategy

Liu

Jian

2021

Sustainability

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“…Several manufacturers have begun introducing car-sharing schemes besides sales channel ( Bellos et al, 2017 ), the manufacturers need to contemplate whether joins car-sharing and how its product line design. Researchers have studied on the manufacturer’s selection of sharing mode ( Li et al, 2020 , Zhang et al, 2020 ). Specifically, Li et al (2020) consider OEM’s selection between cooperation with third-party B2C platforms and third-party P2P platform.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Researchers have studied on the manufacturer’s selection of sharing mode ( Li et al, 2020 , Zhang et al, 2020 ). Specifically, Li et al (2020) consider OEM’s selection between cooperation with third-party B2C platforms and third-party P2P platform. However, Zhang et al (2020) investigate the manufacturer’s choice over joined mode or built mode.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, Zhang et al (2020) investigate the manufacturer’s choice over joined mode or built mode. Of the studies noted above, we also contribute to mode selection what is similar to Li et al, 2020 , Zhang et al, 2020 . However, considering the impact of a pandemic on the consumer’s attitude towards car-sharing, we develop a novel sharing economy mode where sharing products are offered by owners and the manufacturer in a third-party platform.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impact of coronavirus pandemic on sharing mode of manufacturer

Mao

Zhang

Yang

et al. 2021

Computers & Industrial Engineering

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“…Unlike traditional companies, sharing economy companies that focus on rights of usage rather than ownership use platforms to connect providers with idle capacity to customers (Liu et al., 2019). These platform‐based sharing companies increase resource utilization, affecting the behaviors of customers, providers, and the government (Li et al., 2020). Examples of well‐known platforms include Uber and Didi Chuxing in ride‐sharing services, Doordash and Deliveroo (UK) in food delivery services, and Streetbank and Omni in goods rental services (Zhao and Chen, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential pricing strategies of ride‐sharing platforms: choosing customers or drivers?

Zhao

Yuan

Chen

et al. 2021

Int Trans Operational Res

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Ride‐sharing platforms, such as Uber and Didi Chuxing, widely use differential pricing strategies to encourage platform participation. However, it remains unclear whether differential pricing strategies in ride sharing are reasonable when users care about price fairness. Moreover, platforms face a unique dilemma when considering differential pricing: should it be used for customers, drivers, or both? On the demand side, platforms must deal with taxi competition, while the supply side contends with government regulation; it is this dilemma that motivates our work. Using a stylized model that includes price fairness, market conditions, and government policies, we consider four ride‐sharing platform pricing strategies: uniform pricing, differential customer pricing, differential driver pricing, and bilateral differential pricing. We present results from three perspectives. For platforms, we obtain feasible regions in all four pricing strategies. If the maximal number of potential drivers is below certain thresholds, a platform will use differential driver pricing. Conversely, differential customer pricing is optimal when the maximal number of potential drivers is sufficiently large. Moreover, when customers have stronger fairness concerns, platforms tend to use differential driver pricing to reduce competition. From the government perspective, when a platform charges customers differently, the government can achieve a win‐win solution for sustainable development and market stability by setting a proper taxi rate. Interestingly, we find that, for the demand and supply sides, an increase in fairness concerns may hurt customers and drivers under certain conditions.

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Business modes in the sharing economy: How does the OEM cooperate with third-party sharing platforms?

Cited by 59 publications

References 22 publications

Manufacturer’s Sharing Servitization Transformation and Product Pricing Strategy

Manufacturer’s Sharing Servitization Transformation and Product Pricing Strategy

Impact of coronavirus pandemic on sharing mode of manufacturer

Differential pricing strategies of ride‐sharing platforms: choosing customers or drivers?

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