Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

Abstract

This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party‐focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters’ ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, it is argued that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, the article shows how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. The article discusses how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.

Politicians as Party Hacks: Party Loyalty and Public Distrust in Politicians

“…In contrast, the delegate style and trustee style imply that they follow the interests of their constituency or their own conscience, respectively (Eulau et al 1959; representative styles exist but that the partisan style of representation tends to dominate (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012;Martin 2014;Deschouwer and Depauw 2014). By institutional design, parties hold control mechanisms, such as control over candidate nomination, committee assignment, and campaign financing, to enforce loyalty and, in turn, govern effectively (Kam 2009;Martin 2014;Bøggild and Pedersen 2018).…”

“…The first question was a standard formulation used and validated in elite surveys (including in the US, UK, and Denmark, see Eulau et al 1959;Deschouwer and Depauw 2014;Bøggild and Pedersen 2018) to tap politicians' preference for partisan relative to delegate representation:…”

Two strategies for building a personal vote: Personalized representation in the UK and Denmark

“…MPs in single-member districts will intensify the constituency-oriented relative to the party-oriented strategy, whereas MPs in multimember districts will intensify a person-oriented strategy, since these are the strategies more like to pay off in the given system. shown to influence the way MPs vote in legislatures (Kam 2009), how they understand their role as MPs (Önnudottir 2014), and how they run their electoral campaigns (Bøggild and Pedersen 2017). When making choices regarding building a personal vote, politicians are likely to consider the party nomination procedures.…”

“…However, scholars have debated the extent to which personal linkages have become increasingly important, and whether they do so at the expense of party linkages. Existing evidence demonstrating the personalization of representation is inconclusive (Cross et al 2018;Karvonen 2010;Kriesi 2012;Rahat and Kenig 2018;Rahat and Sheafer 2007); limited in focus on electoral campaigns; and relies on self-reported survey measures to estimate the level of personalized politics among politicians (André et al 2014;Bøggild and Pedersen 2017;Cross and Young 2015;Zittel 2015).…”

Analysis of Political Parties Representation in Parliament Influence Public Policy Formulation in Uganda’s Nascent Hydrocarbon Industry

“…The study area as a sub-theme briefly captures the genesis of hydrocarbon industry in Uganda since 1925(Bategeka et al, 2013). The research targeted a population of 490 to guide the study from which a sample size of 218 was selected and included: Leaders of major political organizations (04), the Prime Minister, leader of Opposition, Minister of Energy and Mineral Development and Chairperson of Committee of Natural Resources, Members of NRM in Parliament (329), Members of DP in Parliament(15), Members of UPC party in Parliament (06), Scholars who have written extensively on politics and public policy in Uganda (09) as shown in table one(1).…”