Can energy saving and emission reduction policies promote green transformation of industrial enterprises——The Case of China

Abstract

In the context of the continued advancement of the green economy transition, the proactive pursuit of carbon emissions reduction and the early attainment of carbon neutrality goals have emerged as essential components in promoting high-quality economic development. Not only does it contribute to the creation of a community of human destiny, but it is also vital to the realization of sustainable development for human civilization. A dynamic evolutionary game model, which encompasses the interactions among government, enterprises, and the public, was constructed to examine the inherent impact mechanisms of the behavior of three players on the development of a green economy under the context of energy saving and emission reduction subsidies. The results showed that the incentive and punishment mechanisms served as effective tools for harmonizing the interests of system members. Within the mechanisms, the public demonstrated a higher sensitivity to rewards, while enterprises exhibited greater responsiveness to fines. Consequently, the government could influence the behavior of enterprises by incentivizing the public to serve as a third-party inquiry and oversight body. Simultaneously, the government could encourage enterprises to expedite green technology innovation by employing a combination of incentive and punishment mechanisms.